Public procurement in the European Community. Research and Documentation Papers, Economic Series No. 21, 1991 by unknown
\_J 
/  ·, 
*** 
*  *  *  *  *  *  *** 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
't 
l9IRECTORATE GENERAL 
FOR RESEARCH 
~~.' 
Economic Series No. 
21 
December 1991 
RESEARCH AND DOCUMENTATION PAPERS 
_pUBLIC  PROCUREMENT 
IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
PE·100355EN24/17·2·92 Publi6a dana la mAme  a6rie: 
n2 1:  L'industrie automobile dans  la Communaut6 
d6cembre  1985 
n2.~:  Les relations monetaires Etats-Unis/CEE 
juin 1986 
n2 2:  L'achivement du  Marche  Interieur:  suites 
donnees par la commission et le Conseil 
aux  avis du  Parlement, 
septembre  1986 
n2  10:  Les politiques communautaires dans  le 
domaine  de  l'audiovisuel 
n2 11:  La  France et la libre circulation des 
capitaux en Europe, 
septembre  1987 
n2 12:  Les relations economiques entre le CEE 
et le Japon, 
octobre 1987 
n2  13:  La  cohesion economique et sociale de la 
communaute 
janvier 1988 
n2 14:  La  liberalisation des mouvements  de 
capitaux dans  la Communaute  et ses 
tmplications pour la Grice 
avril 1988 
n2 15:  Les problimes economiques de !'harmoni-
sation de  l'tmp6t sur le chiffre 
d'affaires apris l'achivement du  marche 
interieur de la Communaute  europeenne, 
decembre  1989. 
n2  16:  Le  degre d'autonomie des banques centrale& 
dans  les Etats membres  de la Communaute, 
septembre  1990 
n2  17:  Fiscalite des entreprises et marche 
interieur de la Communaute 
- Problimes et perspectives -
octobre 1990 
n2  18:  Concentration in the media  industry 
The  Community  and mass  media regulations 
The  role of the European Parliament 
September  1991. 
Lanoue  a 
DE,  EN,  ES,  FR,  IT, 
DE,  EN 
FR 
EN 
FR 
DE,  EN 
EN,  FR 
EN 
DE,  EN 
EN 
DE,  FR,  IT 
DE,  EN,  FR, n2  19:  Progress in the implementation of the 
common  market  for telecommunications 
services and equipment 
September  1991. 
n2  20:  Le  parlement europ6en et l'Union 6conomique et 
mon6taire 
novembre  1991 
This publication appears in the following  languages: 
DA 
DE  available 
EN  available 
ES 
FR  available 
GR 
IT 
NL  available 
PT 
DE,  EN,  FR, 
DE,  EN,  FR, 
This  study does not represent the official opinion of the European Parliament. 
Publisher: 
Editor: 
EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT 
Directorate General  for Research 
Internal Market Division 
L  - 2929  LUXEMBOURG. 
Tel:  (00352)  4300-1 
FAX:  (00352)  43  40  71 
Mr.  Frank Schuerman& The  economic  significance  of  public  procurement  in  the  Community  is 
considerable.  In  1987  it accounted  for  some  15\ of  Community  GDP  or  a  total 
of ECU  550 billion. 
European markets  in this area are still highly  fragmented  and  access is often 
restricted to national or even local suppliers. 
As  long  ago  as  the  70s  the  Commission  had  acted to make  use of that economic 
potential.  It  drew  up  directives  laying  down  rules  on  the  award  of  public 
supplies  and  work contracts,  but  owing  to the  lack of  precise drafting,  these 
directives were  easy to circumvent  and  did not  achieve the  hoped-for success. 
In  the  programme  for  achieving  the  single  internal  market  after 1992,  public 
procurement  now  gets  pride  of  place.  The  liberalization of these markets  is 
bound  to  yield  substantial  savings  for  the  Community.  The  strengthening  of 
competitiveness  as  a  result  of  that  liberalization will  also  have  a  dynamic 
impact all round. 
In  the  context  of  the  cooperation  procedure  laid  down  in the Single European 
Act,  the  European  Parliament,  with  the  help  of  the  Commission,  has  made  a 
vital contribution to the emergence of  a  single body  of  Community  legislation 
on public-sector procurement that will be,  in terms  of both  form  and content, 
complete,  accessible and transparent. 
The  Community  directives are designed to facilitate access to the markets  and 
to  rule  out  all  forms  of  discrimination  and  national  favouritism.  The  rules 
they  lay  down  coordinate  the  procedures  for  awarding  public  contracts in the 
various  Member  States  and  guarantee  all  undertakings  access  to  the  relevant 
information.  These  new  arrangements  for  public  procurement  should  therefore 
result in a  much  greater degree of market transparency. 
It  should  also  be  pointed  out  that  the  thresholds  for  implementing  these 
directives  are  fixed  at  levels  that  allow  minor  contr·acts  to  be  awarded 
without  opening  them  up  to  Community  competition.  There  will  thus  always  be 
plenty of opportunities available to regional undertakings. 
The  directive  on  harmonization  of  judicial  review  procedures,  which  tightens 
up  the  monitoring  of  contract  award  procedures  within  the  Member  States  and 
the Commission's  own  checks,  is designed to ensure implementation of the other 
directives  and  is  consequently  the  keystone  of  the  relevant  European 
legislation. 
Lastly,  this  legislation  will  create  opportunities  for  the  Community  to 
negotiate with third countries on access to each other's markets on a  basis of 
reciprocity. 
The  new  European  legislation  on  public  procurement  that  is  now  gradually 
taking shape will be an essential mechanism  in fully consolidating an  internal 
market  in the Community. 
The  European  Parliament's  research  department  has  taken  the  initiative  of 
drawing up this highly interesting document,  which provides  a  general overview 
of the  main  features  of public  procurement  in the European  Community.  It was 
- i  -
DOC_EN\RESRCH\117748 drafted by Mr F.  Schuerman&,  in close cooperation with his trainee assistants, 
Jean-Baptiste  Morlot  and  Karina  Bauer.  The  document  deals  also  with  the 
problems  of  incorporating  Community  legislation  into  national  law.  The 
application of  Community  legislation by the Member  States will,  after all, be 
crucial to the  successful  operation  of  the  single  internal market;  indeed it 
can fairly be regarded as the touchstone of the whole operation. 
The  European  Parliament,  and  its  Committee  on  Economic  and  Monetary  Affairs 
and  Industrial  Policy  in  particular,  have  contributed  substantially  to 
securing  consolidated  European  legislation  on  public  procurement  and  hope 
thereby  to  ensure  that  this  crucial  component  o  the  post-1992  programme  is 
crowned with success. 
DOC_EN\RESRCH\117748 
Bouke  BEUMER 
Chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Economic 
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The  economic  value of public  procurement  in the  Community  is considerable and 
its role  in  European  economic  integration  is of  first  importance.  Yet  'the 
continuing  fragmentation  of national  (public)  procurement  is one  of the most 
evident  obstacles  to  securing  a  genuine  internal  market' •  We  therefore 
propose  considering  the  reality  of  the  situation  in  this  area  within  the 
Member  States and at Community  level. 
Firstly however it will be appropriate to define certain basic concepts: 
public-sector  expenditure,  which  includes  wages,  salaries  and  other 
remunerations,  financial charges,  transfers,  purchases; 
public  purchases  (from  10  to  20\  of  administrative  expenditure)  which 
relate to payments  for goods or services supplied by third parties; 
public  procurement  contracts  which  themselves  form  part  of  public 
purchases;  these  administrative  contracts  are  the  subject  of  invitations 
to tender and are very highly formalized with a  limited period of validity; 
they should theoretically be open to competition - but current expenditure, 
rentals,  expenditure on heating and electricity,  insurance premiums,  postal 
and  telephone  expenses,  etc.  are  excluded  from  public  procurement 
contracts. 
It  should  also  be  noted 
governments  (national, 
undertakings. 
that  public 
regional  and 
procurement  originates  both  with 
local)  and  with  public-sector 
General economic asaesSIDBnt of plblic contracts 
The  assessment is set out in Table  1  below1 
1  Commission  of  the  EC,  Communication  on  a  Community  regime  for  procurement 
in the excluded sectors,  COM(88)  376  final,  in Bull EC,  Supplement  6/88,  p. 
12,  Table 1. 
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Total purchasing 
by general 
government 
Total purchasing 
by public 
enterprises 
Total public 
purchasing  (as 
per cent of GOP) 
Total public 
B 
6.3 
10.6 
16.9 
(17.5) 
D 
58.5 
34.4 
92.9 
(11.8) 
F 
53.7 
34.2 
87.9 
(14.1) 
I 
43.6 
24.8 
68.4 
(13.1) 
UK 
64.7 
54.2 
118.9 
(21.8) 
(billion ECU) 
Total for 
the five 
countries 
226.8 
158.2 
385.0 
(15.0) 
procurement1  7.7-11.0 42.5-62.6 39.3-58.2  31.1-43.4 54.2-76.2  174.8-251.4 
(as per cent of 
GOP)  (8-11.4)  (5.4-8.0)  (6.3-9.3)  (6.8-8.3)  (10-14.1)  (6.8-9.8) 
Sources:  Eurostat;  Atkins 
1  Public procurement:  that part of public purchasing which is the subject of 
contracts,  estimated  by  Atkins  at  between  45  and  65'  of  total  public 
purchasing. 
The  most  striking  feature  is  perhaps  the  extent  of  variation  as  between 
governments  and  public-sector  undertakings.  For  example,  public-sector 
undertakings  account  for  63'  of public-sector purchases  in Belgium,  for  30 to 
40\  in France,  Germany  and Italy. 
Moreover,  if  the  figures  in  Table  1  are  extrapolated  for  the  Community  of 
Twelve  in  1987,  it is  found  that public purchasing  as  a  whole  represents  15' 
of  Community  GOP  (ECU  592  billion),  whereas  public  procurement  would  account 
for  7  and  10' of  GOP  (from  ECU  260  to 380  billion).  With  such  large  sums  at 
st.ake  it  is  not  hard  to  see  why  the  European  Community  is  interested  in 
securing its liberalization. 
The  assessment will now  be considered in detail. 
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1.  Analysis by product or group of products 
Table 2,  showing public purchasing,  will be taken as  a  basis2 
Table 2  - Breakdown of public purchasing for goods and services by product1  in 
1984 
Bztrapolation  of  figures  for  five  COIIIltriea  (B,  D,  P,  I,  Ult)  to 
BUR  12 
NACE-CLIO  Group 
01  Agriculture, 
products 
forestry  and  fishery 
06  Energy products,  of which: 
031  Coal  and coal briquettes 
073  Refined petroleum products 
097  Electrical power 
Billion ECU 
2.7 
73.2 
15.6 
36.0 
9.9 
30 Manufactured goods,  of which  147.2 
170 Chemical  goods 
190 Metal  goods 
210 Agricultural and industrial machinery 
230 Office equipment,  etc. 
250 Electrical goods 
270  Motor vehicles 
290 other transport equipment 
473  Paper  and printing products 
53  Construction 
530  Building and construction 
68  Market  services,  of which 
570 Wholesale  and retail distribution 
590  Hotels  and catering 
611  Road  transport 
670  Communications 
690  Banking  and  insurance 
710  Business services 
730  Letting of buildings 
790  Market  services  NCS 
Source:  Atkins,  using input-output tables 
14.5 
9.8 
12.2 
8.6 
19.9 
8.2 
37.5 
10.5 
129.1 
98.3 
11.0 
6.0 
5.4 
8.0 
8.4 
20.7 
6.2 
12.1 
'  of total 
public 
purchasing 
0.6 
16.3 
32.7 
28.6 
21.8 
3.5 
8.0 
2.2 
3.2 
2.2 
2.7 
1.9 
4.4 
1.8 
8.3 
2.3 
2.4 
1.3 
1.2 
1.8 
1.9 
4.6 
1.4 
2.7 
1  Within  each  sector,  only  product  groups  accounting  for  over  1' of  total 
public purchasing are listed. 
2  In  1984  the total of public purchasing at  ECU  490.5  billion for  EUR  12  was 
equivalent  to  15'  of  GOP.  The  figure  for  1986,  assuming  an  unchanged 
proportion of GOP,  is ECU  550 billion. 
2  Ibid,  p.  13,  Table  3 
OOC_EN\RESRCH\117748  - 8  -These  public  contracts  are  concentrated  on  a  somewhat  ltmited  group  of 
industrial  sectors3' 4 :  one  third of  ·  industrial  sectors  studied  accounts 
for  85\  of  the  public  contracts.  other  words,  construction  and  civil 
engineering account  for nearly 30' of  ~ne total in  pub~ic contracts; military, 
telecOIIIDunicat  ons and railway equipment and postal se.:·vices account  for 20  to 
35,,  and energy products for 16'  (heating and energy production). 
Moreover,  it  is  important  to  know  the  dimensions  of  public  procurement  in 
reLation  to total public  purchasing,  in  some  of  these sectors.  For  example, 
it  accounts  for  60'  of  public  purchasing  in  information  technology,  30'  in 
housing construction and civil engineering5 • 
The  combination  of  the  two  types  of  data  considered  above  is  of  crucial 
importance to the analysis of the impact of opening up public procurement  (cf. 
Part 2). 
2.  Analysis by entity or group of entities 
Table  3  gives  a  fairly clear  summary  of the major differences that can exist 
between certain Community  countries  (5  of  them  are  shown  here)  as regards the 
number  and  types  of  purchasing  entities.  It  should  be  noted  that  in  the 
tables  reproduced  above,  the  public-sector  undertakings  in  question  are 
national ones,  and consequently are centralized. 
Source:  Research  on  the  'Cost  of  non-Europe'  - Vol.  5,  Part  A:  The  cost of 
non-Europe in public-sector procurement  - Full report - Par  I  - 3.6 p 
102  Table  3.6.1.  - Document,  Commission  of  the  European  Communities 
by Atkins Management  consultants. 
3 
4 
5 
Ibid,  p.  7. 
EC  Commission,  Communication  on  the  regional  and  social  aspects  of  public 
procurement,  (COM(89)  400  final,  24.7.1989,  pp.  5  and  6. 
Ibid,  p.  5,  paragraph 15. 
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 Attention is drawn to the significant connection that can be  observed between 
the  degree  of  decentralization  and,  on  the  one  hand,  the  sharing  of 
responsl.bilities  between  the  entities  and,  on  the  other,  the  number  and 
economic  importance of the contracts concluded. 
Thus  in  all  Member  States,  defence,  railways,  postal  and  telecommunications 
services  (which  account  for  20  to  35%  of total public  procurement)  are highly 
centralized.  Except  in  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  and  Italy,  much  the 
same  can  be  said  of  electricity,  gas,  water,  transport  infrastructures  and 
public  health6 •  It should  be  noted that a  good  many  of these  sectors are  in 
the hands of national public undertakings. 
Public  procurement  that  depends  on  centralized  authorities  often  applies  to 
fundamental  economic  sectors  or those  with  major  development  potential.  The 
particularly  important  role  of  the  centralized  contracting  authorities  is 
confirmed  by  the  analysis  of  the  number  and  economic  scope of the contracts; 
there  too,  central  government  and  public-sector  undertakings  are  clearly 
dominant.  This is clearly indicated by Tables  5  and  6,  derived  from  a  sample 
of  just  over  4000  contracts  chosen  from  5  countries  (Belgium,  France,  Italy, 
FRG,  UK)  (Table 4)7• 
Table 4:  Breakdown of the saaple of public-sector contracts  (million BCD) 
6 
7 
Country 
Belgium 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
UK 
Total 
No.  of 
contracts 
1101.00 
744.00 
568.00 
847.00 
733.00 
4033.00 
Total 
value 
857.33 
1466.38 
1085.68 
2129.66 
2876.38 
8415.43 
Average 
value 
0.78 
1.97 
1.91 
2.51 
3.72 
2.09 
Commission  of  the  EC,  'The  cost  of  non-Europe  in  public-sector 
procurement',  DOCUMENT  op.  cit., executive summary,  p.  11,  No.  4.1. 
Ibid,  full  report,  Part  I,  pp.  257,  258,  264  and  267,  Tables  Nos.  6.2.1. 
and 6.2.4. 
OOC_EN\RESRCH\117748  - 11  -Table  Sa  Average  size  of  contracts  broken  dolm  by  contracting  entity 
(Dlillion BCD) 
Entity type 
Central govt.  - Min. 
Central govt- other 
Regional govt. 
Local govt. 
Public enterprises 
Total 
No.  of 
contracts 
1370.00 
531.00 
159.00 
617.00 
1356.00 
4033.00 
Total 
value 
3682.78 
1046.11 
85.47 
399.52 
3201.54 
8415.43 
Average 
value 
2.69 
1.97 
0.54 
0.65 
2.36 
2.09 
Table 6:  Size of contracts by type of contracting entity 
Entity type 
Central govt.  - Min 
Central govt.  - other 
Regional govt. 
Local govt. 
Public enterprises 
Unspecified 
Total 
No. 
0.1 
123 
153 
26 
186 
223 
0 
711 
of contracts in 
0.1 to 1.0 
873 
279 
114 
348 
794 
0 
2408 
Is there a  Burope in public procurement? 
the range  (million ECU) 
1  to 10  10 
309  65 
72  27 
19  0 
79  4 
271  68 
0  0 
750  164 
There  has  so  far  been  no  difficulty in establishing the considerable economic 
significance of  public  procurement.  The  data  set  out  above  is sufficient to 
give  an  idea of the political  and  economic difficulties that can arise in the 
course of the process of opening up public procurement. 
Firstly,  its  importance  to  the  economies  of  the  Member  States  of  the 
Community  is  such  that  it can  in  no  circumstances  be  a  neutral  component  of 
the  latter.  on  the  contrary,  it acts  as  its  controlling  mechanism.  That 
explains why  it has  been the  subject of extensive discriminatory practices to 
avoid  Community  competition  considered  as  disruptive  and  dangerous.  The 
walling  off  of  public  procurement  by  state is beyond  dispute,  even  if it is 
now  being  mitigated  as  a  result  of  the  recent  reforms  undertaken  by  the 
Community  authorities. 
DOC  EN\RESRCH\117748  - 12  -One  indicator of  that walling  off  is the fact that the level of  ~ports into 
the  community  as  a  whole  is  significantly  higher  than  the  level  of  ~ports 
resulting from public purchasing8 •  Table  7  shows this clearly9• 
Table 7  - IJDporta in public purchasing,  1985 
8  D  F  I  UK 
National  ~port penetration1  (\)  43  22  20  19  22 
Imports in public purchasing  (\)  2.6  3.8  1.6  0.3  0.4 
1  Penetration = imports/internal demand 
Sources:  National Accounts Eurostat,  1985;  Atkins,  1987. 
Consequently,  there is no  'Europe'  in public procurement. 
Secondly,  and  conversely,  the  economic  significance of  public  procurement  in 
the  Community  is  a  key  component  of  completing  the  internal  market.  Its 
volume is precisely what  accounts for its enormous  significance in the context 
of economic  integration.  The  absence of liberalization in public  procurement 
therefore represents a  cost to the Community  as a  whole. 
consequently,  we  shall consider in turn the two  aspects of the problem as they 
have  been  set  out  above:  it will  be  ~portant both  to  establish  precisely 
why  opening  up  public  procurement  at  Community  level  is so difficult,  and to 
assess the coats and  losses resulting from this fragmentation. 
The  remainder of this study  comp~iaea two main parts: 
1.  The  causes of  'non-Europe' 
2.  The  coat of  'non-Europe'  in public procurement. 
8 
9 
EC  Commission,  Communication  on  a  Community  regime  for  procurement  in  the 
excluded sectors,  op.  cit., p.  7,  paragraph 3. 
Ibid,  p.  12,  Table 2. 
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The  causes  are  evidently threefold:  psychological,  economic  and  legal,  the 
last being a  result of the other two. 
I.  TBB  'PSYCHOLOGICAL'  RBASORS 
We.have  taken the liberty of  using the term  'psychological'  in a  more  popular 
sense  than  is generally  understood  in  a  scientific context.  We  have  used it 
because  of  the  image  it  tends  to  evoke;  here  it  in  fact  covers  both 
individual  behaviour  and,  at  a  more  collective  level,  established  public 
service practices. 
In  practice,  the  contracting  authorities  act  through  civil  servants  or  (in 
the  case  of  public-sector  undertakings)  employees.  The  behaviour  of  these 
individuals  is  sometimes  crucial.  Yet,  particularly  in  decentralized 
administrations,  though also  in central  government  departments,  it can  happen 
that administrators  do  not  have  the qualifications necessary to cope  with all 
the  intricacies  of  public  procurement.  Moreover,  it is  not  always  easy  for 
them  to make  a  valid  assessment  of  tenders;  that  is all the  more  likely if 
such  tenders,  which  may  refer  to  unusual  specifications,  are  submitted  by 
foreign companies whose precise circumstances can be difficult to assess. 
Moreover  these officials are  often motivated  more  by  a  desire to protect the 
public  purse  than  by  the  commercial  profitability of  the projects  submitted. 
In  addition,  they  are  constrained to operate  in  adherence  to stringent rules 
of  public-sector  accounting;  moreover,  contract  specifications  are  often 
descriptive rather than geared to performance.  Lastly,  government  departments 
have  a  habit of  concluding contracts with undertakings that are well  known  to 
them  in terms  of  financial,  commercial  and  technical  considerations  and at  a 
personal  level;  the  undertakings  themselves  are  correspondingly  in  a  better 
position to comply  with  deadlines,  technical  specifications etc.  set by  those 
government  bodies as  a  result of their regular contacts with them. 
However  a  change,  discernible to varying degrees according to Member  State,  is 
beginning  to  operate  within  central  government,  particularly  certain 
ministries  (public  works,  defence,  nationalized  industries,  etc).  The 
relevant departments  include specialist staff more  in touch with the business 
world.  That  in  itself  does  nothing to open  up  European  public  procurement, 
since the  departments  concerned  continue to deal  with  national  suppliers  who 
are well  known  to  them.  At  all events,  they  scarcely  feel  any  need  to  seek 
out  undertakings  beyond their  own  borders,  preferring to pass  responsibility 
to  national  intermediaries:  their  supplier  or  usual  operator  himself,  or 
importer  (agencies,  subsidiaries  etc).  And  where  they  do  come  across  an 
interesting project  submitted  by  a  foreign  undertaking they tend  nevertheless 
to approach  a  firm  in their own  country  in an  attempt to obtain an equivalent 
offer. 
Conversely,  suppliers  or  contractors  looking  for  business  are  often  at  a 
disadvantage  owing  to  lack  of  information  about  public  contracts  in  other 
countries.  Similarly,  the  poor  guarantees  of  redress  available  in  certain 
Member  States  against  the  contracting  entities  have  often  discouraged  them 
from  applying. 
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The  reasons  for  preferring  to  buy  at  home  are  by  no  means  always  open  to 
criticism;  some  of  them are in fact perfectly justified,  e.g.  in relation to 
routine  supplies  and  works10•  The  reasons  can  include  lower  marketing, 
trading  or  transport  costs,  after-sales  service,  insurance  costs,  shorter 
completion  deadlines,  the  particular  circumstances  of  purchasers  (schools, 
hospitals  etc),  or  customs  procedures;  many  of  these  reasons  will  cease to 
apply after completion of the internal market. 
On  the  other  hand  there  are  also  other reasons that  have  become  difficult to 
justify in the present  economic  context11•  A brief historical recapitulation 
shows  that  after  having  served  as  mechanisms  of  structural policy in the  60s 
(policy  of  'national champions'),  public procurement contracts were  also used 
by  the  Member  States  as  a  means  of  economic  policy  adjustment  from  the  70s 
onwards,  which  saw  the  beginning  of  a  period  of  recession.  They  have 
essentially  become  factors  in  economic,  social  and  regional  policy  in  an 
exclusively national perspective. 
The  first directives  concerning  the  coordination  of  procedures  for  the  award 
of public works  contracts12  and  supply contracts13  bore that out  (see chapter 
3  below).  As  stated for example in the directive on supply contracts  (Article 
25 (4)),  'paragraph  l  shall  not  apply  when  a  Member  state bases  the  award of 
contracts on  other criteria within the framework of rules existing at the time 
this  Directive  is  adopted,  whose  aim  is  to  give  preference  to  certain 
tenderers,  on  condition  that  the  rules  invoked  are  compatible  with  the 
Treaty'. 
This  outlook  has  become  standard  practice. with  the  contracting  authorities, 
even though the economic  context  has  changed considerably  in the  interim.  It 
can be  noted that14: 
in  the  case  of  'visible'  goods,  such  as  vehicles  (in  particular  motor 
cars),  prestige  furniture  and  crockery  it is  considered  good  form  to  buy 
nationally; 
in  the  case  of  so-called  'strategic'  goods  (electricity  production, 
telecommunications,  defence,  etc)  all  countries  seek to maintain  security 
of supply by  supporting national industries; 
buying  from  national  producers  can  of  course  also  be  a  good  means  of 
avoiding  job  losses if these producers  belong to sectors  in decline  (coal, 
rail rolling stock,  heavy construction,  shipyards etc); 
the existence of  specific  standards  used  in networks  set up  gradually over 
the  past  hundred  years  or  so  (water,  electricity,  railways,  etc)  is often 
used as an  argument  by the contracting authorities; 
1° Commission  document,  'The cost of non-Europe  in public-sector procurement', 
op.  cit., Full Report,  Part.  I, p.9. 
11  Case-studies  and  documents  in  the  Revue  Franc;aise  de  Droit  administratif 
(RFDA),  Lea  Marches  Publics Europ6ens  CDroit  Communautaire,  Droit compare), 
1989,  Paris,  RFDA-Sirey,  p.14 
12  Directive 71/305/EEC,  OJ  EC  NO.  L  185,  16.8.1971,  p.5 
13  Directive 77/62/EEC,  OJ  No.  L  13,  15.1.1977,  p.1 
14  The  cost  of  non-Europe  in  public-sector  procurement',  op.  cit.,  Full 
Report,  Part I,  p.  9,  Commission  document. 
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industries  not  necessarily  favourable  to the  environment  are  being  set  up 
(nuclear industry,  coal mining,  etc). 
The  unremittingly  national  perspective  in  which  these  considerations  are 
applied,  sometimes  understandably,  comes  clearly  to  the  fore  here.  The 
underlying  behaviour,  based  always  ·on  the  short  term,  has  had  serious 
implications  for  the  effectiveness  of  the  first  legislative  instrument 
relating to public  contracts  implemented  by  the  Community.  While  it is fair 
to characterize this directive  as  somewhat  half-hearted,  it is highly  likely 
that  if  it  had  been  any  more  ambitious  its  implementation,  already  a  very 
delicate matter,  would  have been extremely difficult. 
III.  TBB  LBGAL  RBASORS 
In order to understand the failure of  Community  enactments,  it will be useful 
to have an overview of the relevant legislation as  a  whole. 
A.  The first texts adopted in the area of plblic procuraaent 
1.  The  Treaty of Rome  and the principle of liberalization 
The  Treaty of  Rome  is silent on public  procurement,  at least explicitly.  The 
negotiators  at  that  time  were  aware  of  the difficulties that  would  be  posed 
for  ratification of the Treaty by  national parliaments if rules requiring the 
opening up of public procurement had been  included in it15• 
However  some  provisions  of  the  Treaty  do  in  fact  include  public-sector 
procurement  in their area of application.  Article 7  of the Treaty for example 
prohibits  in  general  terms  discrimination  based  on  nationality.  There  are 
also other more specific provisions. 
(a)  Free movement  of goods 
Articles 30  ff prohibit in particular quantitative restrictions on  imports  and 
exports  as  well  as  measures  having  equivalent  effect.  The  Commission 
considered  it  appropriate  to  make  the  prohibition  of  all  measures  having 
equivalent  effect  explicit  in  a  liberalization  directive  adopted  on 
17  December  196916  concerning  public  supply  contracts.  That  directive  came 
into  force  at  the  end  of  the  transition  period,  measures  with  equivalent 
effect  being  henceforward  prohibited  by  virtue  of  Articles  30  and  34  of  the 
Treaty  which  were  directly  applicable.  It  consequently  has  only  an 
interpretative value. 
(b)  Free movement  of services 
Based  on  Articles  59  ff  of  the  Treaty,  this  is  based  on  the  principle  of 
national treatment.  In the area of public works  procurement  a  liberalization 
directive  was  also  adopted,  this  time  by  the  Council,  on  26  July  1971,  also 
with  an  interpretative function17 •  It should  however  be  noted that the first 
15  FLAMME,  M-A.,  FLAMME,  P.,  'Vers  l'Europe  des  march6s  publics?',  in  RMC  no. 
320,  Septembre-Octobre 1988,  p.456. 
16  Commission Directive 70/32/EEC,  OJ  L  13,  19.1.1970,  p.1 
17  Directive 71/304/EEC,  OJ  NO.  L  185,  16.8.1971,  p.1 
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originating  with  the  Council  and  binding  (see  paragraph  2),  refers  to  this 
liberalization directive in order to lay down  its scope. 
As  can  be  seen,  the  Treaty  of  Rome,  as  interpreted by  these directives,  only 
creates  negative  obligations.  While  that  may  lead  to  the  implementation  of 
effective  competition  between  undertakings  originating  in  different  Member 
States,  the  disparity  in  national  provisions  relating  to  public  ~ rocurement 
has  made  the  above  texts  inoperative.  If public  procurement  is t  ~  be  opened 
up it will be  necessary to  impose certain positive obligations  on contracting 
authorities. 
2.  The  first  directives  coordinating  procedures  for  the  award  of  public 
procurement contracts 
Having  rapidly  reached  the  conclusions  described  above,  the  commission 
submitted  two  proposals  for  directives coordinating  procedures  for  the  award 
of  public  procurement  contracts,  adopted  by  the  Council  on  26  July  1971  as 
regards public works18  and on  21  December  1976  for supply contracts19• 
These  two  texts  form  the  basis  for  the  reform  recently  introduced  by  the 
Commission  and  strongly  supported  by  the  European  Parliament,  and  which  will 
be explained in detail below. 
The  legal analysis of the texts governing public procurement  in the Community, 
in  particular  the  above  two  directives,  is  not  precisely  our  concern;  our 
purpose  rather  is  to  determine  the  causes  of  'non-Europe'  in  public 
procurement,  and  consequently  to  identify  the  role  of  those  texts  in  that 
failure. 
In  any  case,  the  Guide  to public  procurement  in the  Community20  drawn  up  in 
1987  by the Commission gives an excellent account of the initial directives on 
public works  and supplies. 
The principal features of the first directives are as follows: 
Firstly,  these  are texts  having  a  real  binding effect,  and  as  such  complying 
entirely  with  the  conditions  laid  down  in  Article  189  of  the  Treaty,  as 
distinct  from  the  'liberalization'  directives.  Though  the  adoption  of  two 
texts,  rather  than  a  single  text,  seemed  preferable  to  take  account  of 
specific  features  peculiar  to  the  two  types  of  public  contract  concerned,  a 
close parallelism is nonetheless apparent between the two directives. 
The  supplies  directive  concerns  deliveries  of  products  (Article  1(a)),  which 
has  a  wider  meaning  than  a  transfer  of  property  as  it  is  customarily 
understood.  It thus includes any  form of supply,  purchasing,  hiring,  leasing, 
etc.  The  public  works  directive  is  hardly  more  precise:  it  refers  to 
construction and  civil engineering as  listed in clause  40  of the Nomenclature 
of the Industries in the European Communities  (NICE)  (Article 1(c)). 
18  Council Directive 71/305/EEC,  OJ  L  185,  16.8.1971,  p.S 
19  Council Directive 77/62/EEC,  OJ  L  13,  15.1.1977,  p.1 
20  OJ  No.  C 358,  31.12.1987,  p.1 
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or legal persons under public law  (Article l(b)  and Annex  I  in both cases). 
The  threshold  for  application of  the  supplies  directive is normally  fixed at 
ECU  200  000  (Article  5).  However  Council  directive  80/767  /EEC  of  .22  July 
198021 ,  acknowledging  the  consequences  of  the  GATT  agreement  on  public 
procurement22,  introduced  a  number  of  changes:  the  threshold was  lowered  in 
the case of purchase contracts concluded  by the entities listed in Annex  I  to 
Directive  No.  80/767/EEC.  The  threshold  is  changed  annually  in  response  to 
exchange-rate  fluctuations  (ECU  181  500  excluding  VAT  in  1987).  In the case 
of  the  public  works  directive,  the  threshold  is  set  at  one  million  ECU 
(Article 7). 
Both  texts  lay  down  rules  for  preventing the  splitting-up or underestimation 
of contracts as  a  means  of evading application of the directives. 
The  excluded sectors in both cases are transport services,  and the production, 
transportation  and  distribution  of  water  and  energy  supplies.  The  supplies 
directive  also  excludes  telecommunications  and  specifically military products 
from its area of application. 
Both  directives  stipulate  that  the  use  of  the  'open'  award  procedures  (in 
which  any  supplier  or  undertaking  can  submit  tenders)  or  'restricted' 
procedures  (under which only suppliers or undertakings authorized to submit  by 
the contracting authority may  submit tenders)  shall  be  the rule,  by reason of 
the  effect  of  these  procedures  in  opening  tendering  up  to competition.  The 
use of the  'direct agreement'  procedure is restricted to exceptional cases. 
As  to the  selection of  tenderers,  the texts  require the use of non-arbitrary 
qualifying  criteria  in  order  to  maintain  competition.  Identical  cases  for 
exclusion  (bankruptcy,  grave  professional  misconduct,  default  on  payment  of 
taxes  or  social  security contributions,  etc)  are  provided  for,  and  tenderers 
must  show  proof of their economic,  financial  and technical capacity. 
The  criteria  for  awarding  contracts  to  candidates  are  either  simply  the 
lowest  price  or  the  fact  that  the  tender  is  'economically  the  most 
advantageous';  examples  of  appropriate criteria are provided to clarify this 
term. 
As  already  pointed  out  (see  chapter  II)  regional  or  sectoral preferences  are 
allowable on the part of Member  States. 
As  regards  the  technical  specifications  laid  down  by  the  contracting 
authorities,  these must  always  be stipulated in general  documents  (notices of 
invitation  to  tender,  tender  specifications)  or  in  the  specific  contractual 
documents  for  each  contract.  Moreover,  the  public  works  directive  (Article 
10)  stipulates that  'technical  specifications  may  be  defined  by  reference to 
national  standards'.  The  more  advanced  supplies  directive  (Article  7)  lays 
down  a  descending  order  of  preference  for  reference  standards:  Community, 
international,  national  and  any  other  standards.  Here  again,  nothing  is 
compulsory.  Compliance is entirely voluntary. 
21  OJ  L  215,  18.8.1980,  p.l 
22  OJ  L  71,  17.3.1980,  p.44 
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procedures,  the  supplies  directive  (Article  9)  requires  publication  of 
invitations  to  tender  in  the  'S'  supplement  to  the_ Official  Journal  of  the 
European Communities. 
This applies to contracts  awarded  by  an  open  or restricted procedure,  but not 
to  contracts  covered  by  GATT.  Nothing  is  stipulated  as  regards  direct-
agreement  procedures.  The  public works  directive contains  very  similar rules 
ad•pted to the particular features  of those sectors.  Finally,  a  large number 
of  procedural  deadlines  is provided  for,  including  deadlines  for  accelerated 
procedures  (emergency procurement). 
B.  Analysis of the failure of these texts 
Since  we  have  already  had  occasion to refer to the causes  of  the  failure of 
the  liberalization  directives  (see  section  1,  last  part  of  paragraph  1)  we 
shall  concentrate  here  on  the  directives  on  the  coordination  of  public 
procurement  award  procedures.  These  two  directives  on  public  works  and 
supplies were in any event the only ones that contained any real innovations. 
The  legal  causes  for  the  failure  of  these  texts  are  threefold:  they  are  a 
mixture  of  complexity  and  vagueness;  they do  not  go  far  enough  and  were  not 
followed  up  by  the  development  of  other  Community  activities  that  could 
interact with public-sector procurement. 
1.  Insufficient transparency 
(a)  A larae number  of texts 
The relevant texts are as  follows: 
the two  liberalization directives; 
the  two  directives  on  public  works  and  supplies  referring back to the two 
previous texts; 
the  GATT  code  adopted  on  12  April  1979  which  entered  into  force  in  the 
Community  under  Council  Decision  No.  80/271/EEC23;  its  field  of 
application  overlaps  with  that  of  the  supplies  directive  without  being 
coordinated  with  it;  moreover  the  code  is  directly  applicable  in  the 
Community  and  compulsory  in every respect,  whereas the directives are only 
compulsory in terms of the result to be achieved; 
Directive 80/767/EEC  amending the  supplies directive to bring it into line 
with the GATT  code; 
A  protocol  amending  the  GATT  code  concluded  on  2  February  1987  which 
entered into force  in the Community  under a  council decision of 16  November 
198724• 
The  Member  States  were  not  slow  to  argue  that  the  complexity  of  all  this 
legislation caused difficulties in implementing the directives.  The  problems 
were  heightened  by the varying degrees  of  advancement  of  specific legislation 
on  public  procurement,  which  was  very  unequal  from  one  Member  state  to 
23  OJ  L  71,  17.3.1980,  p.44 
24  OJ  L  345,  9.12.1987,  p.24 
DOC_EN\RESRCH\117748  - 19  -another;  the means  used to incorporate the directives in national  law varied 
widely in themselves  (acts,  decrees,  circulars,  etc)25 • 
(b)  Lack of precision 
The  texts  lack  precision  in  many  areas:  this  has  resulted  in  the  risk, 
sometimes  borne  out  in practice,  of  divergent  interpretations of  the  various 
provisions  from  one  Member  State to another.  The  exact  determination of the 
excluded  sectors is one  example.  This  led the Commission  to specify a  number 
of  interpretations  which  it considered  as  being the most  appropriate,  and  to 
try  to  get  them  accepted  by  the  Member  States  by  means  of  letters,  for 
example.  This  approach turned out to be wholly  inadequate.  Moreover,  certain 
provisions  of  the  directives  can  easily  be  circumvented.  That  is certainly 
true  of  the  implementation  thresholds.  In  the  case  of  public  supplies 
contracts,  the  volume  of  public  procurement  awarded  below  the  threshold  has 
accounted  in  some  cases  for  70\  of  the  total  public  procurement  business 
concluded26 •  Without  always·  being  as  high  as  this  the  high  incidence  of 
contracts  evading  the  threshold  is  a  general  characteristic  of  the  Member 
States of the Community  among  the signatories to the GATT  code.  The  reason is 
either  an  under-estimation  of  the  real  value  of  contracts,  or  the  unlawful 
splitting-up thereof.  This  irregular practice is facilitated  by  the  lack of 
stringency of the rules intended to prevent it. 
Another  feature is the reluctance of the contracting authorities in the Member 
States  to  use  the  award  procedures  conducive  to  competition  between 
applicants;  there  has  thus  been  a  discernible  tendency  to  use  the  direct-
agreement  procedure  because  the  relevant  conditions  laid  down  in  the 
directives are less restrictive. 
Moreover,  in  a  large  number  of  areas  these  texts  leave  wide  discretionary 
powers  to the contracting authorities;  they may  freely choose the restricted 
procedure,  award contracts according to the criterion of the economically most 
advantageous  tender  (verifying that this criterion has  been  used is difficult 
where  an  undertaking  brings  discrimination  proceedings),  refuse  to  justify 
decisions  to  reject  tenders  or,  quite  simply,  where  their  bad  faith  risks 
becoming  apparent,  discontinue  a  procedure rather than let the contract  go to 
a  foreign  firm.  Moreover  the  texts  do  not  do  enough  to  prevent  technical 
standards being used as  a  means  of walling off national  procurement;  bringing 
proceedings before the Court  of Justice of the European  Communities  is hardly 
a  practicable step in the case of public procurement procedures. 
Finally,  the provisions of the directives themselves are scarcely conducive to 
procedural  transparency:  all that  is published  are  notices  of  invitation to 
tender,  and  such  a  restricted form  of publication at the initial stage of the 
procedure  is  insufficient.  Moreover,  the  deadlines  for  the  procedure  are 
relatively  short:  36  days  in  the  case  of  open  procedures,  21  days  for  the 
others,  not  counting  'urgent'  cases  (12  or  10  days),  which  are difficult to 
monitor. 
25  Communication  from  the Commission  to the  Council:  public  supply contracts 
- conclusions and perspectives,  COM(84)  717  final,  14  December  1984,  p.8 
26  Ibid,  p.13 
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(a)  Exclusion of various sectors 
The  public  works  and  supplies  directives  exclude  from  their  field  of 
application  transport  services  (managed  by  bodies  incorporated  under  public 
law),  water  and  energy  supplies  (their  production,  distribution  and 
transportation),  and,  in  the  case  of  supplies  procurement  only,  the 
telecommunications  and  defence  sectors  (specifically  military  equipment: 
armaments,  munitions,  etc). 
These  exclusions  are  bound  to  be  prejudicial  to  any  real  opening  up  of 
procurement,  since,  as  rightly  pointed  out  by  the  European  Parliament's 
Committee  on  Economic  and  Monetary  Affairs  and  Industrial  Policy27 ,  these 
relate,  in  some  cases,  to  advanced  technologies  with  high  capital  density. 
The  committee  also  pointed  to  the  enormous  size  of  the  telecommunications 
market  and  to  the  volume  ·of  purchasing  by  public  administrations  and 
companies  in that sector28• 
It is therefore highly regrettable that these sectors  have  been  excluded  from 
a  particularly high  growth  potential;  the  Commission  itself states that  'the 
absence  of  these  sectors  may  explain  to  a  large extent  the  poor  performance 
under the directives'.29 
Mention  should  also  be  made  of  the  non-implementation  of  the  public  works 
directive  to  concession  contracts,  the  economic  significance  of  which  is 
obvious,  as well as the exclusion of relations between administrations and the 
recipients  of  'special  exclusive  rights'  from  the  scope  of  the  supplies 
directive.  The  concept of  'special exclusive rights'  also lacks precision. 
Lastly,  it would  be  desirable to insist on options  for  SMUs  to participate in 
the  public  contract  procedures  to  which  the  directives  apply  (problem  of 
threshold;  in  the  supplies  directive  the  possibility  of  subdividing  large 
contracts into lots is offset by the obligation to take into account the value 
of the lots as a  whole  for the purposes of  implementing the directive  (Article 
5 ( 3)).  The  earlier  public  works  directive  is unfortunately  silent  on  this 
subject. 
(b)  The  absence of guarantees of redress 
There  are  no  provisions  on  this matter,.  whereas  it is crucial to the  success 
or failure of the whole  system. 
In  the  interest  of  the  credibility  of  the  directives  with  undertakings,  it 
would  have  been  essential  to  ensure  that  at  least  their  application  was 
monitored,  given  that  Member  State  legislation  in  this  connection  is  highly 
disparate  or  even  non-existent  1  That  being  so,  the  lack  of  enthusiasm  of 
contractors  to  submit  tenders  beyond  the  frontiers  of  their  own  Member  State 
is understandable. 
27  European  Parliament  Committee  on  Economic  and  Monetary 
Industrial  Policy,  Draft  report  on  communication  COMt84> 
PE  97.711,  2  May  1985,  p.11,  paragraph 10. 
28  Ibid.,  p.  11,  paragraph 13 
29  Commission,  COM(84)717  final,  op.cit., p.13. 
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717  final, The  right  of  redress  available  to  the  Commission  against  a  Member  State  for 
failure  to  fulfil  an  obligation  under  the  Treaty  (Article  169),  however 
effective  in  other  contexts,  is  nevertheless  inappropriate  to  public 
procurement,  where the greatest possible speed is desirable. 
In  any  case,  the  highly  complex  area  of  redress  in  relation  to  public 
procurement  requires  a  specific  set  of  legislative  provisions.  A 
multiplicity  of  rules  must  after  all  be  laid  down  to  cover  the  question  of 
interested parties and third parties,  the payment of compensation,  suspensions 
of  procedure,  cancellation  of  certain  clauses,  guarantees  against  risks  of 
'reprisals'  by  contracting  authorities  subsequent  to  proceedings  brought  by 
undertakings  discriminated  against  (blacklisting),  the  form  of  law  concerned 
(Community  and/or  national  law),  etc.  The  foregoing  illustrates  the 
seriousness of these omissions. 
Nor  are  there  any  provisions·regarding  compliance  with  the provisions of the 
directives  by  the  European  institutions.  The  Commission  acknowledges  this 
fact,  giving  as  justification the  need  to  have  observed  a  transitional  stage 
during  implementation  of  the  public  works  and  supplies  directives.  The 
Community  authorities  thus  failed  to  make  compliance  with  the  directives  by 
the  contracting  authorities  a  condition  of  Community  contributions  to  the 
financing of certain projects.  The  Commission therefore decided to change its 
attitude:  'it would  seem  appropriate  that  the  Commission  should  in  its  own 
procurement  activities  set  the  example  for  the  Member  States  by  voluntarily 
applying as far as possible the dispositions of the directives'.30 
The  Committee  on  Economic  and  Monetary  Affairs  and  Industrial  Policy  also 
expressed  surprise at the  restriction contained  in that  formulation31•  What 
is  the  justification?  It  should  be  noted that  the  European  Investment  Bank 
(EIB)  itself  decided  to  make  an  effort  in this direction  by  encouraging  its 
clients to  adhere  to the directives,  and  also to open  up  business to foreign 
undertakings in the excluded areas. 
(c)  Excessively formalistic texts 
It  is  fair  to  say  that  the  two  directives  are  unnecessarily  cautious  in 
defining  the  concept  of  public  procurement.  They  appear  to  have  been  left 
behind  by  developments  in  the  law  of  contract.  They  say  nothing  e~plicitly 
about  leasing-purchase  contracts  with  or  without  an  option  to  buy,  credit-
leases,  or  'turnkey'  sales,  for  example,  or  about  the  cost  of  preparatory 
studies,  prototypes,  insurance,  etc. 
3.  An  uncompleted market 
The  opening  up  of  public  procurement  forms  part,  as  indeed  do  many  other 
sectors,  of  a  complex  network  of  multiple  transactions.  It  is  virtually 
impossible  to  liberalize  public  procurement  in  the  absence  of  significant 
progress in many  areas. 
The  public  works  and  supplies  directives  did  not  benefit  from  the  climate 
created  by  the  Commission's  White  Paper  on  completing  the  internal  market, 
3° Commission,  OOM(84)  717  final,  p.  20 
31  EP,  draft report on COM<84>717  final,  p.  10,  paragraph 6 
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directives were not part of an overall programme. 
Accordingly,  we  note  the  inadequacy  of  the  provisions  of the directives with 
regard to technical  standards:  the public  works  directive merely  refers  back 
to national  standards,  while the supplies directive draws  up  a  classification 
without  binding effect,  albeit putting  Community  standards  at the top of the 
list.  It was  hardly possible to do otherwise before the adoption of a  Council 
reEJolution  on  7  May  1985  that  was  responsible  for  a  major  change:  the 
standardization  directives  would  subsequently  lay  down  the  essential 
requirements,  with  other  details  to  be  decided  on  the  basis  of  mutual 
recognition. 
Similarly,  progress  on  company  law  was  required:  obtaining  certain  public-
procurement  contracts  sometimes  requires  appropriately  adapted  structures. 
But  there were  no  rules on  company  mergers  and  hiving-offs,  European Economic 
Interest  Groupings  (EEIG),  'the  European  limited  company  or  measures  to 
encourage  cooperation  between  undertakings,  or  action  programmes  to  assist 
SMUs. 
The  opening  up  of  public  procurement  will  also  depend  on  progress  being 
achieved  with  the  free  movement  of  capital,  yet  little had  been  accomplished 
in that  area  before  1986  (long-term  capital  movement)  or  1988  (movements  of 
current capital). 
Lastly,  there had to be fiscal harmonization of indirect taxation,  corporation 
tax and tax arrangements applicable to groups. 
Obviously,  any  progress  in the  area of  monetary  policy  (exchange  rates)  will 
tend to foster .the opening up of public procurement. 
All  these  deficiencies  and  the  associated  behaviour  added  up  to  a  specific 
cost:  a  delay  in  securing  European  economic  integration.  Given the economic 
significance  of  public  procurement,  however,  a  reaction  by  the  Community 
authorities was  inevitable. 
The  study  on  the  'cost of  non-Europe'  in the area of  public procurement  thus 
gave  a  decisive  impetus  to  reform  of  the  initial  texts.  The  constant 
updating  of  that  study  will  subsequently  enable  those  texts  to  be  improved 
further. 
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lost  opportunities,  the  gains  that  have  not  been  achieved  because  of 
maintaining compartmentalization in national markets.  What  we  shall therefore 
consider  here  is the expected consequences  of the opening  up  of public-sector 
procurement.  Actual  achievement  of  these  gains  is  likely to  be  accelerated 
by.the recent revision of the relevant directives.  As  pointed out below,  the 
public  works  and  supplies  directives  have  again  been  amended  and  the 
directives  on  the  excluded  sectors,  services  and  guarantees  of  redress  have 
been  enacted.  The  announcement  of  these  texts  has  already  had  certain 
preventive  effects;  we  shall  obviously  mention  them  since  they  allow  the 
results  of  previous  studies to be  corrected.  However,  these initial effects 
should  be  viewed  with  circumspection  because  they  are  short-term  effects, 
whereas  completion  of  the  internal  market  must  be  analysed  in the  long  term. 
They nevertheless provide some  useful indicators. 
Before  considering  the  exact  consequences  of  decompartmentalizing  public 
sector  procurement  we  shall  review  the  types  of  effects  that  are  generally 
expected to ensue.  The  figures  in  what  follows  must  of  course be  considered 
with  caution;  they  must  always  be  read  in  the  light  of  the  initial 
hypothesis. 
I:  GBRBRAL  Bn'BCTS  OP  TBB  OPBRIIIG  UP  OP  PUBLIC-SBCTOR  PROC1JRBIIBlft 
In the context of the study carried out into the cost of non-Europe  in public-
sector procurement32 ,  the economic  assumptions used by the consultants  (volume 
of public-sector purchasing and of fixed private consumption,  unchanged profit 
levels  assuming that price changes  correspond to changes  in production costs) 
meant  that the level of prices  and  hence  of public expenditure were essential 
data. 
The  industrial  sectors  of  relevance  here  are  those  of  which  the  contracting 
authorities are among  the principal customers. 
Three types of effect are expected in the following chronological order: 
1.  A direct static effect: 
This  should  coincide  with  completion  of  the  internal  market  in  1992;  the 
resulting  savings  in  the  budgets  of  the  contracting  authorities  arise  from 
the  fact  that  those  authorities will  buy  from  undertakings  offering the best 
terms and that are the most  competitive. 
The  main  hypothesis  presupposes  an  unchanged  market  volume  and  relates  to 
goods  traded  on  monopolistic  markets.  The  result  of  all  this  should  be 
increased  interpenetration  of  public  procurement  markets  in  the  different 
Member  States. 
32  Commission  document,  'The cost of non-Europe  in public-sector procurement', 
p.  42,  Full Report,  Part II, p.  42. 
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This  should  follow  closely  from  the  effect  mentioned  above:  given  the 
interpenetration of national markets  and the heic;  ··· tened competition that will 
result from it, national undertakings will tend to lower their prices to align 
them with those of foreign undertakings.  This effect on prices,  since it will 
result  in  budgetary  savings  for  the  contracting  authorities,  should  be 
followed  by  an  effect  on  prcx.,  r::tion  costs  requiring  undertakings  to 
reorganize,  rationalize  and  invest  in  new  technologies.  The  quicker  the 
competition effect results in  falls in profits, the quicker they will do  so. 
3.  A restructuring effect 
This  will  be  a  more  long-term effect  (from  5  to  10 years).  Restructuring of 
undertakings  (see  above)  should  create  economies  of  scale  and  lead  to 
reductions  in  costs  and  in  sales  prices  by  all  undertakings  staying  on  the 
market. 
An  assessment  of  the  economic  impact  of  all these effects  is given  in table 
8: 
Table 8:  Breakdown by country of the econcaic effects of liberalization of 
public procurement  (billion BCD) 
5  EUR  12 
Static effect 
3.7 
Competition effect 
2.3 
Restructuring effect 
7.2 
Total 1984 
3.4 
(as  '  of GDP) 
0.5 
Additional savings 
in defence sector 
Total  (including 
defence) 
15.4  17.9  22 
B 
Prices 19841 
D 
EUR  12 
0.2 
0.5 
11.7 
Source:  Atkins;  Commission departments. 
F 
0.4 
4.4 
0.8 
2.8 
1.0 
8.9 
1.1 
0.5 
Prices 19892 
I  UK  EUR 
1.0  0.3  1.01.0 
5.5 
0.3  0.4  0.32.0 
1.4  1.0  2.16.0 
1.1  2.8  2.02.4 
13.9  17.2 
0.4  0.3  0.40.6 
0.5 
3.744.8 
The  extrapolation  of  the  figures  to  EUR  12  is  based  on  the  effects 
remaining constant as  a  '  of GDP. 
1  COM(88)376  final,  op.  cit., table no.  7,  p.  16 
2  .COM(89)400  final,  op.  cit., p.  5,  paragraph 12. 
If efficient use was  made  of the margin resulting  from  the expected savings to 
increase  economic  activity,  around  400  000  jobs  could  be  created  in  the 
Community. 
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possibility  that  private  purchasers  will  benefit  from  the  savings  resulting 
from the increased competition affecting suppliers of public authorities.  The 
sectors  concerned  - office  equipnent,  pharmacies,  construction,  etc.  - are 
those  where  sales  are  shared  between  the  public  and  private  sectors.  The 
economy  as  a  whole  would  ultimately  be  affected,  since  the  effect  of 
restructuring  through  mergers  or  cooperation  between  businesses,  eliminating 
duplication,  could  lead  to  lower  R&D  and  marketing  costs.  The  increased 
efficiency  would  thus  have  an  impact  on  investment  and,  more  generally,  on 
growth. 
The  competitiveness  of  European  industry  consequently  can  be  considerably 
enhanced  by  liberalization  of  public-sector  procurement.  The  implications 
therefore  go  far  beyond  mere  budget  savings.  However  - and  this  is  a 
criticism that we  shall be reiterating - it is dangerous to state the problems 
of  public-sector  procurement  simply  in  those  terms.  As  we  have  already 
pointed  out,  public  contracts  interact  with  many  other  factors  in  the 
internal market  and the common  policies.  It will  sometimes  be very difficult 
to identify the specific impact of the opening up of public procurement  in the 
economic effects observed. 
We  shall now  consider  some  more  specific areas in defence of that assertion. 
II. TIIB  SBC'l'ORAL  BPFBCTS  OP  OPBHIRG  UP  PUBLIC-SBC'l'OR  PROCtJRBMBRT 
These  effects  will  tend  to  be  concentrated  on  certain  industries,  in 
particular  those  enjoying  an  oligopolistic  situation  (limited  number  of 
producers)  or  in  which  the  public  authorities  (public  administrations  and 
undertakings)  are the main customers  (Table 9)33• 
33  COM(88)  376 final,  op.  cit. p.  15,  Table No.  4 
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NACE  Sector 
11  Extraction and briquetting of solid fuels 
152  Production and processing of fissionable 
and fertile materials 
221  Iron and steel industry 
222  Manufacture of steel tubes 
314/315 Manufacture of structural metal products, 
boilers,  reservoirs,  tanks and other 
sheet-metal containers 
33  Manufacture of office and data-processing 
pp output 
of sector 
(') 
60 
20 
10 
10 
30 
machinery  30 
342  Manufacture of electrical machinery  30 
344  Manufacture of telecommunications equipment,  90 
measuring equipment  and electro-medical  variable 
equipment 
362  Manufacture of standard and  narrowguage 
railway and tramway rolling stock  90 
364  Aerospace equipment manufacturing and repairing  50 
source:  Atkins 
Proportion 
in total PP 
(') 
3.7 
0.3 
0.1 
0.1 
1.2 
0.9 
0.9 
0.7 
0.9 
2 
The  Member  States  do  not  hesitate  to  lend  their  support  to  these  'national 
leaders'  for  so-called  strategic  reasons  (security  of  supply)  or  social  ones 
(protecting  the  jobs  concerned).  This  form  of  national  favouritism  in 
awarding  public  contracts  comes  on  top  of  the  aid  these  undertakings  often 
need,  in particular  by  reason  of  the  research  and  development  (R&D)  required 
or the poor economic  health of the relevant sectors34 • 
We  shall  next  review the savings  that ought  to result  from the liberalization 
of  public-sector procurement  (~~antitative aspect),  after which  we  shall  look 
at  the  restructuring  that  wil~  be  certain to  take  place  in  certain  sectors 
(qualitative aspect). 
34  Ibid,  p.  8,  paragraphs 9.10. 
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The  effects  can  be  expected  to  be  rather  slow to .appear  in certain sectors, 
such  as  housing  construction,  where  products  tend  not  to be  interchangeable, 
or again in cases where prior development of a  prototype is generally required 
and monitored by the public-sector purchaser  (e.g.  for military equipment). 
1:  . Manufactured goods 
As  regards  purchases  of  manufactured  goods  (one  third  of  public-sector 
procurement) ,  the  study  on  the . cost  of  non-Europe35  sought  to  establish 
prices  actually  charged  for  some  forty  products  selected  from  those  most 
frequently  purchased  by  public  administrations  and  undertakings.  The 
potential gains  expected  from  more  open  award  procedures  (static effect),  on 
the  assumption  that the  awarding  authority would  choose  the  most  competitive 
suppliers,  were estimated by deducting  from the price discrepancies identified 
between  countries  the  costs  relating  to  intra-Conununity  trade  (transport, 
marketing,  insurance,  foreign-exchange risks).  An  extrapolation covering all 
products was  then attempted.  We  should point out that the number  of suppliers 
competing  for  a  given  project  is often  low;  this means  that it is reasonable 
to  conclude  that  the  opening  up  of  public-sector  procurement  and  the 
subsequent boost to competition would result in substantial gains. 
Some  of  the  results of  the  static effect of  purchasing economies  are set out 
in Table  1036 
35 
36 
Commission  document,  'The  cost  of  non-Europe  in  public-sector 
procurement',  op.  cit., 
Full Report,  Part II,  pp  55 et seq. 
COM(88)  376 final,  p.  15,  Table No.  5. 
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pmlic procuraaent,1  1984 
Agriculture 
Energy4 
Manufactured  goods 
Plant and machinery 
Current consumption goods 
Intermediate goods 
Building and construction5 
Market  services5 
Total 
Direct 
static 
effect2 
2.7 
. 1.  7 
0.2 
0.8 
0.8 
0.2 
3.7 
Compet-
ition 
effect3 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
1  Calculated for five Member  States  (B,  D,  P,  I,  OK). 
Restruc-
turing 
effect3 
6.0 
6.0 
6.0 
(billion ECU) 
Total 
10.7 
9.7 
0.2 
0.8 
0.8 
0.2 
11.7 
2  Assuming  that,  in  the  public  sector,  the  rate  of  import  penetration  from 
other  EC  countries  rises to the  level  now  found  in the private sector,  for 
80\ of public purchasing. 
3  Atkins  only  estimated  the  effects  of  competition  and  restructuring  in 
sectors  where  public  purchasing  is  so  significant  as  to  be  liable  to 
influence  produce.rs'  behaviour.  This  is  only  the  case  in  the  plant  and 
machinery sector. 
4  Energy is dealt with elsewhere. 
5  In  both  these  sectors,  a  10\  rise  in  import  penetration  and  a  10\  fall  in 
prices are assumed  for 80\ of public purchasing. 
source:  Atkins 
The  table  thus  shows  an  assessment  of  the  competition  effect  on  the 
assumption  that  reductions  in  prices  by  alignment  with  those  of  the  most 
competitive foreign suppliers would be fully reflected in costs. 
The  restructuring effect will  appear  in  two  stages.  Firstly,  an  increase  in 
the rate of utilization of production capacity should result in a  reduction in 
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some  of the sectors considered should be noted  (Table No.  11)37• 
Table 11.  cases of irdlstrial J:eStructuring l.inJEd to the l.iberal.i.zati of PJblic p:ccmanent 
Ctlmunity  Cl1nent  lUd:lar  tlmter  Economie 
DBr'llet  capacity  Int:.ra-!X:  ofiC  of US  of aau.e1 
(billim  utili?atim  trade  p:ccU:ara  p:ccU:ara  (') 
IXlJ)l  (') 
a>i.l.al:makin;J  2  20  very little  12  6  20 
'1\D:bine generators  2  60  very little  10  2  12 
IaxmJti.VE  0.1  5CHJ)  very little  16  2  20 
Mainfrme cx:np1ters  10  80  JC>-1oo2  5  9  5 
~acchanges  7  70  15-452  11  4  20 
~hamsets  5  90  very little  12  17 
Lasers  0.5  50  substantial  over 1000  over 1000  n.a. 
1  scale ecxu:mi.es  z:esultilg fmn a cblbJ.iD1 of aztplt. 
2 Petcentages of total denand. 
Source:  Atkins. 
Subsequently,  mergers  and  amalgamations,  rationalization  of  production 
(reduced  number  of  sites),  reduction  of  development  costs  (more  limited 
product  ranges),  and the effects of  R&D  will also play their part in reducing 
costs  (see Table No.  10). 
2.  Construction and public works 
These  account  for  29'  of  total  public-sector  procurement,  amounting  to 
ECU  150 billion for the Community  of Twelve  in 1986. 
This  sector  is characterized  in. particular  by  a  large  number  of  SMUs  (95'  of 
undertakings)  and by  a  relatively small  number  of European undertakings on the 
Community  market.  Thus,  while  American  construction  firms  in  1986  signed 
contracts on  the European  market  for  a  total of  ECU  6  billion,  European  firms 
were well  behind with  only  ECU  600 million.  Yet  real opportunities exist for 
frontier-zone,  specialized  and  large businesses.  To  that  should be  added the 
37  OOM(88)  376  final,  p.  16,  Table No.  6. 
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to trans-frontier cooperation between firms. 
Public-works  imports representing 10'  (as  a  result of trans-frontier contract 
awards)  of  internal  demand  in  the  different  countries  of  the  Community 
(competition  effect),  in  addition  to  a  potential  saving  of  10'  on  these 
imports  (static  effect),  could  enable  savings  amounting  to  nearly 
ECU  1  billion to  be  made  (for  five  Member  States at  1984  prices).  However, 
the restructuring effect would probably be  limited. 
3.  Services 
This  market  ( 21. 8'  of  public-sector  procurement)  is  scarcely  reliant  on 
public-sector orders,  and the opening  up  of this sector would  benefit private 
undertakings by at least as much.  The restructuring effect would  consequently 
owe  little to the public authorities. 
An  attempt  has  been  made  to  assess  the  direct  economic  impact  by  adopting 
hypotheses  analogous  with  those  applied  to  public  works  procurement  (see 
Table 10). 
4.  Military equipment 
According  to  the  report  by  H.  Vredeling,  published  in  1987  by  NAT038,  this 
market  is  characterized  by  a  number  of  undertakings  each  working  at  a 
strictly  national  level;  this  lack  of  rationalization  entails  additional 
costs that  are all the  heavier  when  one considers the share  accounted  for  by 
R&D  expenditure  (up to 25' or even  40' of total expenditure for sophisticated 
armaments) • 
These  expenditures  are  moreover  highly  dependent  on  public-sector  purchasing 
(Table  12)  39• 
38  CEC  '1992:  the new  European economy',  in European Economy,  No.  35,  March 
1988,  p.  62. 
39  Ibid,  p.  62,  Table 3.4.6. 
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1985  (billion BCD) 
Defence budget 
(as  \  of GDP) 
Expenditure on  arms 
and missile systems 
Potential savings to 
be made2 
B 
3.4 
(3.3) 
0.4 
D 
28.1 
(3.4) 
3.9 
28.3 
(4.2) 
7.6 
I 
15.0 
(2.7) 
2.8 
NL 
5.3 
(3.2) 
1.2 
31.5 
(5.3) 
8.5 
EUR  6  EUR  12 
111.6 
(4.0) 
24.4 
132.6 
(4.0) 
29.3 
6.2 
1  In  the  case  of  France  the  share  of expenditure  on  arms  and missile  systems 
is assumed to be the same  as in the United Kingdom. 
2  It is assumed that the potential  savings  on this type of arms  are analogous 
with those calculated in the Atkins  study for means  of transport  (other than 
motor cars). 
Source:  NATO,  Commission departments 
Here,  the expectation is that opening up public-sector procurement will result 
in  quite  high  levels  of  savings  (Table  12).  Two  thirds  of  the  amount  saved 
would  be  due to a  major  restructuring effect,  given the  fragmentation  in this 
sector.  Even  so  the  figure  thus  obtained  would  have  to  be  reduced  by  the 
amount  relating  to  certain  manufactured  goods  (means  of  transport,  for 
example).  The  final  figure  is  around  ECO  4  billion at  1984  prices,  or  just 
under ECU  5  billion at 1989 prices  (see Table 8). 
We  should  however  point  out  that the  opening  up  of public-sector procurement 
for  specifically military materials  and  equipment  remains  only  a  theoretical 
hypothesis  for  the time being.  Even  the most  recent  Community texts continue 
to exclude them  (see below). 
In  conclusion,  with  a  total  potential  saving  to  the  Community  (Table  6)  of 
ECU  22  billion,  there  is  a  great  deal  at  stake.  However,  beyond the  savings 
achievable,  the dynamic potential,  particularly in structural terms,  is worthy 
of close attention.  We  shall now  look at the qualitative aspect. 
B:  The structural adjustments envisaged 
The  studies  carried  out  by  the  Commission  demonstrated  in  particular  the 
possibility  of  extensive  structural  adjustments  in three  sectors:  electrical 
plant  and  equipment  (energy  production,  railway  and  telecommunications 
equipment).  These  of  course  belong  to  the  sectors  excluded  by  the  first 
directives on public works  and  supplies  (see above,  Part I). 
DOC_EN\RESRCH\117748  - 32  -According  to  a  recent  report  commissioned  by  the  Commission40,  the  railway 
equipment  sector  can  expect  to  experience  a  major  process  of  concentration. 
This  process  had  indeed  already  begun  with  the  announcement  of  the  new 
reform.  Three or  four  large European groups  can then be expected to survive. 
The process should be fairly rapid. 
As  for telecommunications,  some  2500 to 5200  jobs can be expected to disappear 
every  year  for  the  next  six  years,  which  will  have  a  far  from  negligible 
social  impact.  These  job losses,  if carefully distributed,  should not result 
in the closing of more than a  few of the 116 existing production units. 
The  electrical  plant  and  machinery  sector  would  be  least affected.  A  number 
of  major  amalgamations  have  nevertheless  been  carried out  in the turbine  and 
generator  sectors  in  order  not  to  jeopardize  the  subsequent  development  of 
European  industry  in those  sectors.  It is not  however  intended to call into 
question  the  national  positions  of  the  relevant  companies  in  the  different 
countries.  But will that situation be viable in the long term? 
It  is  essential  to  bear  in  mind  that  the  opening  up  of  public-sector 
procurement  is only  one  component  in the  strategy of  businesses.  It will be 
very difficult to determine to what  extent structural  adjustments will  be the 
effect of liberalization of public procurement. 
Moreover,  according to the report,  industrialists still seem pessimistic about 
the  opening  up  process.  In  fact,  people  are  expecting  the  most  important 
changes  to  be  brought  about  by  the  authorities,  by  adopting  a  more  flexible 
approach.  Mere  changes  in the law cannot suffice. 
Finally,  the  sectoral  effects  of  opening  up  public-sector  procurement  will 
generate regional problems. 
XXI:  TBB  RBGIORAL  BITBC'l'S  OP  DIS OPBRIRQ  UP  OP  PUBLIC-SBC'l'OR  PROCtJRBIIBR'.r 
As  in the •ocial  sphere,  this problem is viewed  in terms of risks.  While the 
general  implications  of  liberalization  of  public-sector  procurement  are 
expected  to  be  favourable,  an  analysis  of  the  precise distribution of  these 
effects appears  very difficult.  Public  procurement  is in fact  far  from being 
the  only  factor  responsible  for  the  changes  expected  to  take  place  at 
regional  level.  other,  interrelated  factors  are  involved:  regulations 
governing  standards,  certain  markets  (telecommunications,  for  example), 
freedom  of  establishment,  etc.  Similarly,  while  certain  sectors  or 
undertakings  can  be  identified  as  being  at  risk  regionally.  the  problem  of 
economic  analysis is compounded  by the  investment plans,  innovation  (R&D),  or 
readjustment  measures  (the  choice  of  sites  to  be  saved,  in  particular)  of 
those undertakings. 
4° Commission  DG  on Regional Policy,  The regional  impact of the liberalization 
of public procurement.  Summary  record,  provisional report,  September  1989, 
pp.  67  to 81. 
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anticipated  regional  impact  of 
sectors41 • 
form  a  reasonably  clear  picture  of  the 
the  restructuring  process  in  certain 
As  regards  the  electrical  and  electronics  industries,  including 
telecommunications  equipment  (Map  1),  these sectors often account  for  a  major 
share  of  employment  in  declining  industrial  regions;  these,  in  common  with 
the former,  have been affected by recent  job losses. 
An  equivalent  analysis can equally well  be  applied to the metal manufacturing 
sector  (Map  2). 
The  situation in the electrical engineering sector,  as also in the aeronautics 
and  aircraft  construction  sectors  (in  a  small  number  of  Member  States) ,  is 
primarily of concern to the industrialized regions of the Community  (Maps  3,  4 
and 5). 
Finally,  the railway rolling-stock production sector,  already hard hit by the 
crisis,  is present generally in areas of industrial decline  (Map  6). 
It  can  therefore  be  seen  that  regions  in  industrial  decline  probably  have 
something  to  fear  from  the  liberalization  of  public-sector  procurement 
(although,  once again,  other factors  are  involved),  whereas  less-developed or 
peripheral  regions  will,  directly  at  least,  be  little  affected.  SMUs,  of 
which  there  are  large  numbers  in  these  latter  regions,  can  even  expect  to 
benefit  from  the  opening  up  of  public-sector  procurement  in  the  sectors 
excluded  by  the  first  Community  directives  (water,  energy,  transport, 
telecommunications).  The  most  dynamic  of  these  businesses  will  thus  enjoy 
new  sub-contracting opportunities. 
Conversely,  the peripheral regions will be exposed to a  certain amount  of risk 
if sub-contractors or subsidiaries of specialist firms establish operations in 
their  locality  in  the  sectors  considered  above  that  are  ripe  for 
restructuring. 
These  considerations  led the  commission  to undertake  a  'continuing  study'42, 
at  a  sufficiently refined  sectoral  level  in order  to detect the existence of 
problems  as  soon  as  they  appear.  This  would  open  the  way  to  structural 
intervention  by  the  community  under  its  social  and  regional  policies;  the 
procedures  for  implementing  these  policies  have  recently  been  developed: 
implementing  multiannual  programmes  would  be  open  to  consideration  under 
Objective  No.  1  (regions  lagging  behind)  and  No.  2  (industrial  areas  in 
decline)  under the new  framework regulation resulting from the Structural Fund 
reform43 •  The  action  to  be  taken  to  help  SMUs  would  then  have  to  be  in 
harmony  with the principles of that reform. 
The  main  effect  of  public-sector  procurement  being  opened  up  would  be 
essentially that  of  a  catalyst,  not  necessarily  of  first  importance,  but  in 
combination with  many  other  factors  in the  arrangements  leading to completion 
of  the  internal  market.  This  represents  a  significant  nuancing  of  the 
41  COM(88)  376  final,  op.  cit., pp.  10-11  and pp.  17-22  for maps. 
42  COM(89)  400  final,  p.  8,  No.  25 
43  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  2052/88  of  24  June  1988,  OJ  No.  L  185,  15.7.1988, 
p.  9 
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non-Europe'  in relation to public sector procurement.44  These studies seem to 
suggest'*  however,  that  liberalization  of  public  procurement  would  tend  to 
have  a  favourable  effect  on  economic  and  social  cohesion.  We  have  already 
seen  the  favourable  impact  on  growth  at  Community  level,  .on  the 
rationalization  of  activities,  on  the  growth  of  specialist  undertakings  in 
sectors  hitherto  compartmentalized  (certain  SMUs  located  in  less  developed 
regions in particular). 
Yet  however  favourable  this  impact 
counterbalanced  by  the  extra-community 
public sector procurement? 
may  be,  might 
consequences  of 
it  not  well  be 
the  opening-up  of 
44  Conunission,  DG  for  Regional  Policy,  The  regional  impact  of  the 
liberalization of public procurement  - Summary  report,  op.  cit. 
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A:  The threat to the internal .a.rket 
This  threat  is conditional  upon  the  political  and  economic  decisions  by  the 
European Community  in relation to undertakings in third countries45 • 
One  solution,  albeit  an  extreme  one,  would  be  the  construction of  'Fortress 
Europe',  protecting its industries  against  external  trade  and  so  enabling it 
to  restructure  while  sheltering  from  competition  from  non-member  countries. 
This  course  would  be  favourable  to  the  Community  balance  of  trade; 
nevertheless,  the  absence  of  external  competition  would  be  dangerous  to 
productivity,  to  innovation  and  to  markets  for  Community  firms,  which  are 
often interested in public contracts abroad.  Moreover,  certain projects also 
require  contracts to  be  awarded  to undertakings  in third countries  (specific 
technologies). 
The other,  equally extreme,  solution would be to operate a  free-market policy, 
which  would  provide  extensive  markets  in  the  Community  to  third-country 
undertakings.  After all,  the Community  is already highly liberal  in the area 
of  the  right  of  establishment.  This  would  consequently  be  of  considerable 
interest  to  non-Community  undertakings  that  have  established  subsidiaries  in 
the  Community;  they  would  be  in  a  strong position to take  full  advantage  of 
the  Community's  internal market  where  public-sector procurement  plays  a  major 
role.  The  liberalization  of  that  procurement  in  the  previously  excluded 
sectors  (water,  energy,  transport,  telecommunications)  with  their 
impressively  high  potential,  would  be  of  major  interest  to  undertakings 
seeking  new  markets.  Some  markets  could  well  even  be monopolized  by  some  of 
these undertakings.  Were  that to happen the internal market  would  in a  sense 
turn against the Community  itself. 
B:  The JDeasures taken by the Buropean caDanmity 
Faced  with  these  dangers,  the  Community  has  set  itself  the  following 
objectives46:  on  the  one  hand,  taking  advantage  of  its  continuing  strong 
position  in  negotiations,  conferred  on  it by  the  existence  of  the  means  of 
protecting  the  Community  market,  it must  insist  on  reciprocity  in  access  to 
equivalent  markets.  Without  that  precaution the result  would  be  an  invasion 
of  the  internal  market,  which  would  correspondingly  reduce  the  Community's 
weight  in  the  negotiations.  On  the  other  hand,  access  to  public-sector 
procurement  for  third-country  undertakings  would  have  to  be  introduced 
gradually,  with  Community  undertakings  already  having  to  reorganize  in 
anticipation of  1993.  That  would  enable  them at the  same  time to face  up to 
the  consequences  of  more  open  trade  with  third  countries.  Priority would  of 
course have to be given to Community  standards. 
These  different  factors  have  prompted  the  Community  to  be  highly  active  in 
negotiations within  GATT  to obtain counterpart  arrangements.  As  we  have  seen 
(see  Part  I,  Chapter  III  above),  a  'code'  was  adopted  in  1980  asserting 
equality  of  access  to  public  contracts  for  undertakings  in  the  signatory 
countries  and  approved  by  the  contracting  authorities  stipulated  in  a  list. 
45  COM(88)  376  final,  op.  cit., pp.  12,  63  and  76 
46  COM(88)  376  final,  op.  cit., p.  77 
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lowering  the  threshold.  A  code  of  this  kind  is  essential  to  European 
industry,  and the objective of the negotiations within GATT  is to secure the 
best extra-Community market opportunities for Community  firma. 
Most  of  the  'excluded'  sectors  are  not  covered  by  the  GATT  code  at present. 
However,  the code requires the parties to negotiate  an extension of its scope 
to those  sectors.  The  stakes  here are considerable.  The  United States has  a 
strong  interest  in this matter  and  is pushing hard for the extension and the 
negotiations  have  become  highly complex  precisely on  account  of the interests 
that are at stake.  other negotiations are in the course of conclusion between 
the  Community  and  the  EFTA  Member  States.  Pending  conclusion  of  these 
negotiations,  the  Commission  has  provided  in its proposal  for  a  directive on 
the  excluded  sectors  (see  above)  that  the  contracting  entities will  not  be 
bound  by  the  provisions  of  that  text  when  undertakings  from  third countries 
submit tenders to them. 
The  study  of  the  cost  of  'non-Europe'  highlights  the  considerable 
interdependence  of  public-sector  procurement  with  numerous  other  Community 
activities.  This,  of  course,  makes  it possible to envisage utilizing public-
sector  orders  as  mechanisms  of  economic  intervention,  but  this  time  in  the 
interests  of  economic  integration.  Public-sector  procurement  might  even 
contribute to the achievement of economic  and social cohesion  (Article 130  A-E 
of the Treaty).  It would  indeed appear that the community can scarcely afford 
to forego the advantages of such a  useful economic device. 
CORCLUSIOR 
To  explain  the  failure  of  the  first  Community  measures  on  public-sector 
procurement  one  commentator47  summed  it  up  as  follows:  'The  fundamental 
reason  for  failure,  it seems  to me,  is quite simply that the time was  not yet 
right,  whereas today it is'. Is it though?  That is the question. 
A:  A  new econc::aic context 
In  economic  terms  the  context  has  indeed  changed  considerably.  We  have 
experienced a  period of  growth which,  although it has  now  somewhat  run out of 
steam,  should  tend  more  to  a  perception  of  the  international  environment  in 
terms  of  opportunities  (gains)  rather  than  of  risks,  as  was  the  case  in the 
1970s.  In  addition,  1985  saw  the  adoption  of  the  White  Paper  on  completing 
the  internal  market,  which  envisaged  creating  a  huge  economic  area.  The 
mechanism,  as  well  as  the  laws,  underpinning  this  huge  market,  stimulating 
intra-Community trade,  will in turn tend to favour  growth.  In a  word,  it will 
have  a  synergic  effect.  That  being  so,  the  opening  up  of  public  sector 
procurement is an opportunity to be grasped;  the profits to be made  nationally 
will  count  for  little  compared  with  the  gains  to  be  realized  at  European 
level.  Of  course certain risks remain,  but  a  new  vision is needed;  it will be 
essential to make  the transition  from  short-term pessimism,  which  favours  the 
compartmentalization  of  markets,  to  long-term  optimism.  Such  optimism  must 
become  more widespread both in space and in time;  success depends  upon it. 
47  Dossiers et documents  de  la RFDA,  Lea  marches  publics europtens,  op.  cit., 
p.  9. 
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opportunity  to  be  grasped;  it  is  a  necessity  when  one  considers  the 
Community's  position  in the  international  economic  context.  It is  one of the 
conditions  for  expanding  the  markets  of  European  firms  by  putting  them  on  a 
scale  comparable  to that of their  international  competitors.  Thus  the world 
market  in telecommunications  (one  of the  'excluded'  sectors)  was  worth  ECU  90 
billion in 1987,  18 billion being accounted for by the 12  Member  States of the 
Community.  While the American market accounted for  35\ and Japan 11\,  none of 
th~  European  national  markets,  still compartmentalized,  exceeded  6\  of  that 
total48 •  It  will  be  essential  to  take  advantage  of  the  current  economic 
climate to break out of this impasse,  which is bad for all concerned. 
B:  A new legal context 
The  legal  context  has  also  changed  radically.  Since  1984  the  Commission  has 
issued  three  communications49  affirming  its  determination  to  react  to  its 
initial  failure.  It  confirmed  this  in  the  White  Paper  by  integrating  the 
opening  up  of  public  sector markets  into  a  huge  overall  programme:  that  of 
the  internal  market.  In  its  second  communication  (of  19  June  1986)  in 
particular,  it submitted  an  action programme  on  public-sector procurement  (p. 
5)  setting out the main points of its reform  (increased transparency,  rules on 
the  direct  agreement  procedure,  harmonization  of  technical  standards, 
incorporation  of  the  'excluded'  sectors,  guaranteed  means  of  redress).  This 
resulted in the adoption of  two  directives  amending  the original public works 
and  public  supplies  directives50, 51,  another  on  review  procedures52,  a 
directive  on  the  excluded  sectors53  and  a  proposal  on  means  of  redress  in 
these  sectors54,  a  communication  from  the  commission  to the  Member  States  on 
monitoring  compliance  with  public  procurement  rules  in  the  case  of  projects 
and  programmes  financed  by  the  Structural  Funds  and  financial  instruments55, 
and  a  proposal for a  directive on services.56  · 
These texts have been  a  source of high hopes  for the liberalization of public-
sector  procurement.  As  we  stated  at  the  beginning  of  Part  II,  they  have 
already  had  some  of  the  effects  anticipated  by  certain  undertakings,  even 
before all the  provisions  have  been  adopted.  For  example  the  study of their 
impact  on the creation of  a  Europe of public-sector procurement  has only just 
begun  and  has  revealed  a  number  of  defensive  reflex  reactions  in the  short-
term.  The  study  will  have  to  be  continued  over  several  years,  but  it is 
already  possible  to  venture  some  comments  on  them,  in  anticipation  of  an 
assessment of their potential effectiveness. 
48  Ibid,  p.  6 
49  Commission  communications  of  14.12.1984  (OOM(84)  717  final)  and  19.6.1986 
(COM(86)  375  final),  and  Guide  to  the  Community  rules  on  open  government 
procurement,  OJ  C 358,  31.12.1987,  p.  1 
50 Directive 89/440/EEC,  OJ  No.  L  210,  21.7.1989,  p.  1 
51  Directive 88/295/EEC,  OJ  L  127,  20.5.1988,  p.  1 
52  Directive 89/665/EEC,  OJ  L  395,  23.12.1989 
53  Directive 90/531/EEC,  OJ  L  297,  29.10.1990,  p.  1 
54  Amended  proposal  for  a  directive,  OOM(91)  158  final  - SYN  292,  4  June 1991 
55  OOM(88)  2510,  OJ  C 22,  28.1.1989,  p.  3 
56  Proposal  for  a  directive relating to the coordination of procedures  on the 
award  of  public  service contracts.  OOM(90)  372  final  - SYN  293,  31.1.1991, 
P·  1 
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Provisions  intended  to  supplement  th::  above  directives  are  beginning  to 
appear.  A number  of studies  on the  interaction between the liberalization of 
public-sector  procurement  and  other Community  policies  (regional,  industrial, 
monetary  and  business  policies)  are  in progress,  and  specific  actions  should 
follow.  Supplementary  means  of  publicity  have  appeared;  TED  (Tenders 
Electronic  Daily),  for  example,  can  be  used  at  reduced  rates  by  interested 
firms  to  keep  themselves  abreast  of  notices  of  invitation to  tender  in· the 
Community  and GATT,  and subsequently also EFTA. 
Lastly,  the  Commission  decided  on  4  March  1988  to  implement  a  scheme  for 
monitoring  compliance  with  public  procurement  rules  in  the  case  of  projects 
and  programmes  financed  by  the  structural  funds  and  financial  instruments57 • 
The  scheme entered into force.on 28  March  1989. 
We  can  now  nevertheless  begin  to  attempt  a  juridical  analysis  of  these 
different texts and  submit  an  assessment  of the content of the new  provisions 
in the area of public sector procurement. 
57  Communication  COM(88)  2510,  OJ  No.  c  22,  28.1.1989,  p.  3 
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The  White  Paper on  completing the internal market  published by the Commission 
on  14  ~une 1985  (OOM(85)  310)  places particular emphasis  on the opening-up of 
public  procurement.  Public-sector  procurement  accounts  for  9\  of  Community 
GDP  (15\  when  public-sector  undertakings  are  included)  and  the  contracts 
theoretically  accessible  to  non-national  undertakings  should  account  for 
between  7  and 10\ of GDP.  The  estimates contained in the study on the cost of 
non-Europe  show  that  completion  of  the  internal  market  in this  area will  in 
the medium  to long-term mean  savings  of the order of 0.5\ of Community  GDP58• 
The  opening up of public procurement therefore represents a  major challenge. 
Having  realized  that  the  beat  approach  was  to  impose  certain  positive 
obligations  on  the  contracting  authorities  to  limit  their  discretionary 
powers,  the  Commission  drew  up  two  directives  concerning  the  coordination of 
procedures  for  the  award  of  public  contracts,  adopted  by  the  Council  on  26 
June  1971  in the  case  of public works59,  and  on  21  December  1976  in the case 
of  auppliea60•  These  were  failures,  due to the excessive cautiousness of the 
provisions,  the  failure  to  incorporate  them  correctly  into  national 
legislation  or  poor  enforcement,  evasion  of  the  threshold  rules  for  the 
application  of  the  directives,  the  multiplicity  of  technical  obstacles,  the 
lack of transparency,  and the absence of redress for  injured parties. 
The  Commission  set  out  the  main  points  of  reform  needed  in 198461  (increased 
transparency,  rules  on  direct-agreement contracts,  harmonization of technical 
standards,  rules  on  the  water,  energy,  transport  and  telecommunications 
sectors,  i.e.  the  'excluded'  sectors,  and  guaranteed  means  of  redress)  and 
drew  up  a  programme  for  achieving  the  internal  market  in public procurement. 
This  led  successively to:  two  directives  amending  the original directives on 
the coordination of  award  procedures  for  public  supply  and  works  contracts,  a 
third directive on means  of redress,  a  directive on the sectors excluded under 
the other coordination directives,  a  communication  from  the  Commission to the 
Member  States  on  monitoring  compliance  with  public  procurement  rules  in  the 
case of projects and programmes  financed by the Structural Funds  and financial 
instruments.62  In  July  1990  the  Commission  submitted  a  proposal  laying  down 
remedies  in  the  'excluded'  sectors63  and  in  September  1990  the  Commission 
proposed  a  directive on the coordination of procedures  on the  award of public 
service contracts64•  We  shall concentrate  here firstly on the directives and 
proposals  for  directives  coordinating  the  procedures  and  secondly  on  the 
proposal  for  a  directive  on  remedies;  these texts all relate very closely to 
each other.  The  communication for its part deals with a  specific problem that 
really requires a  separate study. 
58  Commission  communication  'Public  procurement  Regional  and  social 
aspects',  (OOM(89)  400  final,  24.7.1989 
59  Directive 71/305/EEC,  OJ  No.  L  185,  16.8.1971,  p.  5 
60  Directive 77/62/EEC,  OJ  No.  L  13,  15.1.1977,  p.  1 
61  Commission  communications  of  14.12.1984  (OOM(84)  717  final)  and  19.6.1986 
(OOM(86)  375  final),  and  Guide  to  the  Community  rules  on  open  government 
procurement,  OJ c  358,  31.12.1987,  p.  1 
62  COM(88)  2510,  OJ  C 22,  28.1.1989,  p.  3 
63  Commission  proposal  OOM(90)  297  final,  OJ  No.  c  216,  31.8.1990;  amended 
proposal  COM(91)  158  final. 
64  Commission proposal  COM(90)  372,  OJ  No.  c  23,  31.1.1991 
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These  have  all  been  or  still  are  subject  to  the  procedure  for  cooperation 
with  the  European  Parliament,  which  has  contributed  substantially  to  their 
drafting.  The  two  directi'ves  amending  the original supplies  and  public works 
directives  were  adopted  by  the  council  on  22  March  198865  and  18  July  198966 
respectively.  Two  other proposals  on  the  'excluded'  sectors:  water,  energy, 
transport,  on  the  one  hand,  and  telecommunications  on  the other,  were  merged 
on  the  advice  of  the  European  Parliament  and  a  single text was  adopted  on  17 
September 199067 • 
Given that an undeniable parallelism can be detected between these four texts, 
which  form  a  coherent  body  of  legislation,  we  should  consider  the  main 
subjects of this legislation one after the other. 
The  excluded  sectors have  been dealt with separately because of their special 
features,  in particular: 
- technical:  for example,  the need to obtain water supplies locally; 
- econaaic:  the  national  authorities  often  have  major  shareholdings  in  the 
capital of the contracting companies  in these sectors  and  consequently tend 
to favour  national tenderer& when  awarding procurement contracts; 
It being  customary  in these sectors not to proceed by  invitation to tender, 
the  markets  tend  to  be  narrow,  a  feature  intensified  by  the  fact  that 
special rights are conceded to certain applicants; 
- legal:  the  entities  operat_ing  these  services  are  governed  sometimes  by 
public  law,  sometimes  by  private  law;  consequently  a  fair  balance  in  the 
implementing  of  rules  for  the  award  of  procurement  contacts  in  these 
sectors  requires  the entities concerned  to  be  identified otherwise  than  by 
their legal status; 
- political:  some  sectors,  such  as  telecoamunications,  have  a  bearing  on 
sensitive areas  such as  state security.  The  legislation applicable to them 
should take these characteristics into account. 
A.  The  field  of  application  of  the  directives  coordinating  procur81D8nt 
procedures 
1.  The types of contract concerned 
The  new  supplies  and  public works  directives  have  adopted  a  similar approach: 
they have  laid down  the field of application,  while  including  some  additional 
areas compared with the old arrangements. 
The  supplies  directive  consequently  refers  (Article  1(a))  to  'delivery  of 
products'  but  it is  now  stipulated  that  this  can  involve  'purchase,  lease, 
rental  or  hire  purchase,  with  or  without  option  to  buy'.  In  addition,  the 
delivery of such products  'may  include siting and  installation operations'. 
65  Directive 88/295/EEC,  OJ  NO.  L  127,  20.5.1988,  p.  1 
66  Directive 89/440/EEC,  OJ  No.  L  210,  21.7.1989,  p.  1 
67  Directive 90/531/EEC,  OJ  L  297,  29.10.1990,  p.  1 
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works  is now  excluded  (market  in services),  whereas the following are included 
(Article  1(a)):  the  execution,  or  both  the  execution  and  design,  of  works, 
and the execution by  whatever means  of  a  work,  so  as to allow for  innovations 
in the law of contract and concessions  (Article 1b). 
The  directive  on  the  'excluded  sectors'  lacks  any  such  conciseness  (cf. 
Article  2 ( 2) ) ;  it  covers  the  provision  or  operation  of  transport 
infrastructures,  the  exploitation  of  energy  resources,  the  management  of 
networks  intended to provide a  service to the public involving the production, 
transport  or  distribution  of  drinking  water,  electricity,  gas  or  heat,  or 
surface transport  services.  It does  not  entirely cover  the sectors  formerly 
excluded by the public works  and supplies directives. 
The  proposal  for  a  directive  on  services  stipulates  that  public  service 
contracts are contracts for  pecuniary interest concluded in writing between  a 
supplier  and  a  contracting  authority  (Article  1  letter a)  with certain well-
defined  exceptions.  The  definition  thus  covers  all  procurement  not  already 
covered by  the existing directives.  The  proposal  concentrates principally on 
public  service  concessions,  i.e.  operations  for  which  the  public  authorities 
delegate  the  provision of  a  public  service to  an external organization.  One 
of the features of this directive is the distinction it draws between priority 
services  and  other  services  dealt  with  under  their  own  separate 
classification.  Only  the  priority  services  are  subjected  to  a  relatively 
complete  procurement  award  procedure  similar to the  other  public  procurement 
directives.  The  group  of  priority  services  includes  various  types  of 
intellectual  services,  non-restricted  telecommunications  services,  insurance 
services  and  certain  banking  services,  research  and  development  services, 
transport  services  (except  rail,  sea  and  inland  waterway  transport), 
publication  and  printing  services,  and  cleaning,  maintenance,  repair  and 
similar services. 
2.  Excluded sectors and activities 
The  three texts already  adopted,  together with the proposal  on public service 
contracts,  have  in  common  the  stipulation  on  exemptions  aimed  at  averting 
divergencies of interpretation. 
Neither  the  supplies  (Article  2(2))  nor  the  public  works  (Article  3(4)) 
directives  apply  to  the  'sensitive'  areas  (essential  interests  of  a  Member 
State,  for  example),  or to surface,  air,  sea or  inland waterway transport,  or 
to  the  production,  distribution  or  transportation  of  drinking  water,  or  to 
the  production  or  distribution  of  energy  (as  principal  activity),  but  only 
the  supplies  directive  excludes  the  telecommunications  sector  (as  principal 
activity). 
With  the  adoption  of  the  'excluded  sectors'  directive,  these  provisions  have 
been  replaced  with  the  simple  stipulation that  the  sectors  excluded  by  these 
two  directives  are  those  that  are  covered  by  the  new  excluded  sectors 
directive.  That will ensure that the texts complement  each other. 
Finally,  the  'excluded  sectors'  directive itself eliminates  water  purchases, 
the  purchase  of  energy  or  fuels  intended  for  energy  production  (Article  9), 
transport  services  by  bus  open  to  competition  (a  stipulation  insisted  on  by 
the  European  Parliament  - Article  4),  purchases  with  a  view  to  offer~ng 
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general  way,  activities by contracting entities open to competition  (Articles 
6  and  7-)· 
Similarly,  the proposal  for  a  directive on public services lays  down  standard 
derogations  relating  to  state  secrecy  and  security  (Article  4)  and  to 
contracts governed  by  special  award  procedures  (Article 5).  It is applicable 
in the  area of  defence  but  subject to the restrictions laid down  pursuant to 
Article 223 of the Treaty  (Article 4(1)).  Moreover,  the proposal introduces a 
number  of specific derogations  (Article 1)  owing to the very nature of certain 
contracts,  in  particular:  immovable  property  (Article  1(a)  (ii));  contracts 
for the acquisition of programme material,  and contracts for broadcasting time 
pursuing  public  interest  objectives  (Article 1(a)(iii));  contracts  for  voice 
telephony,  telex,  radiotelephony,  paging  and  satellite  services  (Article 
1(a)(iv));  contracts  for  arbitration  and  conciliation  services  (Article 
1(a)(v));  public  service  concessions  relating  to  broadcasting  activities 
(Article l(a)(vi));  financial· services  such  as  issues of  government  bonds  and 
other activities in the area of public debt management  (Article l(a)(vii)). 
3.  The  contractina authorities 
The  supplies directive has  retained its former  provisions  (Article 1(b));  the 
contracting authorities are the state,  regional or local authorities and legal 
persons  governed  by public  law  (or equivalent entities),  and all associations 
of such entities with each other. 
In the public works directive,  in addition to the first two,  they also include 
(European  Parliament  amendment)  'bodies  governed  by  public  law'  defined  as 
meeting  a  number  of  criteria:  having  legal  personality,  subject  to 
supervision  by  a  public  body,  not  having  an  industrial  or  commercial 
character. 
The  proposed  public  services  directive  contains  the  same  provisions  in  this 
connection  as  the  public  works  directive.  The  excluded  sectors  directive 
incorporates  in  full  the  European  Parliament's  amendment  (Article  2(1));  the 
contracting  authorities  are  public  authorities  or  public  undertakings,  or 
undertakings  operating  on  the  basis  of  special  or  exclusive  rights  - the 
relevant  criteria  having  been  stipulated by  the  European  Parliament  (Article 
2(3))- granted  by  a  competent  authority  of  a  Member  State.  The  specific 
features of the sectors concerned played a  major part here. 
4.  The  thresholds 
In  the  case  of  public-sector  supplies  contracts  (Article  5(1)  of  the 
directive),  the threshold remains  fixed at  ECU  200  000.  However,  it falls to 
ECU  130  000  in  the  case  of  contracts  to  which  the  GATT  agreement  is 
applicable.  In  addition,  Article  5(2-5)  lays  down  precise  rules  to prevent 
contracts from being subdivided in order to evade application of the directive 
(principle laid down  in paragraph 6). 
In  the  case  of  public  works  contracts  (Article  4a(l)),  a  new  threshold  is 
fixed  at  ECU  5  m  (in place of  ECU  1  m)  on  an  amendment  by  Parliament.  There 
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been included to prevent the subdivision of contracts  (paragraph 4). 
In the case of the excluded  sectors  (Article  12)  the thresholds are identical 
to  those  in  the  above  directives  for  contracts  for  supplies  and  services 
involving  software  and  public  works  contracts  respectively.  Partly  on  the 
advice of Parliament,  the rules against  subdivision are very similar to those 
contained in the other directives. 
Finally,  for  most  of  the  categories  of  services  considered,  the  proposal 
stipulates  (Article  8)  the  application of  minimal  value  thresholds  contained 
in the supplies directive but adapted to the specific circumstances of certain 
service  contracts.  By  amending  the  proposal  in  this  respect  the  European 
Parliament  sought  to  strengthen  the  analogy  of  the  directive  with  the 
provisions  relating  to  the  opening  up  of  public  service  markets  already  in 
force. 
B.  The hierarchy of public contract award procedures 
A significant  new  feature  of the supplies directive is that it makes  the open 
procedure  the  rule,  and  requires  recourse  to the  other procedures to be  duly 
justified.  In  doing  so  the directive  breaks  with  national  laws  in order to 
give priority to the  procedure  that  'best  assures  the  establishment of  equal 
conditions  for  participating  in  public  contracts  in  all  the  Member  States' 
(11th  recital  and  Article  6 ( 5)).  It will  be  noted  that  the  idea  for  the 
criteria  proposed  for  using  the  restricted  procedure  originates  with  the 
European  Parliament  (Article  6(2)).  As  to  the  'direct-agreement  procedure' 
here referred to as  'negotiated procedure',  the major  innovation is that this 
can  now  be  subject  to  prior  Conununity  publication  (notice  of  invitation  to 
tender),  thereby  safeguarding  a  minimum  of  competition  (Article  6(2)).  In 
other cases,  however  (e.g.  R  & D activities defined narrowly  on the advice of 
the European Parliament),  publication is not compulsory  (Article 6(4)). 
The  public  works  directive  is  not  organized  on  the  hierarchical  principle. 
The  open  and  restricted procedures  are treated equally  (Article  5(4)),  while 
the  negotiated  procedure  is  applied  more  exceptionally.  The  distinction 
between  negotiated  procedure  with  or  without  previous  opening  up  to 
competition  is  retained  with  a  number  of  criteria  drawn  from  the  supplies 
directive  except  that  R  & D activities are  now  subject  to publication.  The 
European Parliament drew up the relevant criteria. 
As  regards the azcladad sectors  (Article  15  of the directive),  free choice of 
procedure  is  the  rule  provided  that  there  is  no  distortion  of  competition. 
The  distinction  between  the  two  types  of  negotiated  procedures  is  retained. 
Most  of the criteria of the two other directives are  amalgamated,  often being 
made  more  flexible,  and  extended  to  service  contracts  for  the  supply  of 
software. 
The  proposal  for  a  directive  on  services  provides  for  arrangements  for  the 
award  of  contracts  for  priority  services  modelled  on  that  of  the  existing 
directives.  In particular it provides  for the  same  flexibility as the public 
works  directive.  Account  has  also  been taken of the characteristics peculiar 
to certain types  of  services  by  providing  for  arrangements  specially  adapted 
to them but without  introducing any particular hierarchy. 
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The  supplies directive  (Article 19s)  and public works directive  (Article 20s), 
in which  little has  been  changed  on  this point,  stipulate that there.must  be 
no  discrimination  between  tenderers;  cases  where  they  may  be  excluded  are 
provided  for;  an entry  in a  professional register is required,  as is proof of 
finaneial,  economic  and technical capability. 
The  new  arrangements  under  the  public  works  directive  include,  firstly,  a 
stipulation  of  the  range  within  which  the  number  of  undertakj.ngs  to  be 
invited to  tender  will  fall  where  contracts  are to  be  awarded  by  restricted 
and  negotiated  procedures  (Article  22 ( 2)  and  ( 3) ) ,  secondly,  a  requirement 
that  the  contracting  party  state  in  the  contract  documents  the  authority or 
authorities  from  which  a  tenderer  may  obtain  the  appropriate  information 
relating to the employment protection provisions applicable to the locality in 
which  the  works  are  to  be  executed  and,  lastly,  a  provision  making  a 
declaration  to  the  effect  that  they  have  complied  with  that  legislation  a 
condition  of  the  choice of  candidates  invited to tender  (Article  22a,  on  the 
basis of a  European Parliament amendment). 
For  practical  reasons  the  excluded  sectors  directive  lays  down  the  basic 
principles  on  which  the  contracting authorities will  draw  up  their own  rules 
for selecting candidates for the restricted and negotiated procedures  (Article 
25(1)).  The  criteria  have  to  be  objective  and  non-diacr~inatory;  the 
exclusion criteria proposed  by  the  two  previous  directives  are  in conformity 
with  that,  as  is  the  fact  of  fixing  a  minimum  number,  as  justified by  the 
concern  to establish  a  balance  between  the  complexity  of  an  awards  procedure 
and  ita  coat  (Article  25(2)  and  (3)).  The  rules  used  are  notified  to 
candidates on request. 
The  question  of  entry  in  a  register  and  quality guarantees  is dealt  with  by 
the  directive  on  services.  That  directive  contains  a  number  of  provisions 
laying down  the same  requirements as the auppliaa and public works directives, 
including  extracts  from  the  judicial  record,  proof  of  enrolment  in  a  trade 
register,  bank  references  or  certificates  of  inclusion  in official  lists of 
approved suppliers. 
D.  contract award criteria 
1.  General criteria 
Here,  there  is total consistency  between  all three directives.  The  relevant 
provisions  of  the  supplies  and  public works  directives  have  not  been  changed 
since they were first laid down  (Articles 25  and  29  respectively).  Article 27 
of  the  excluded  sectors directive is  an  exact  copy  of the others.  The  same 
goes  for the proposal relating to services. 
For  the  award  of  a  contract,  the  contracting authorities  base their decision 
ei~her solely  on  the  lowest  price or on  a  set of criteria intended to enable 
them to select the most  economically advantageous offer.  Variants can then be 
taken  into  consideration.  The  criteria  referred  to  are  no  more  than 
examples.  The  European  Parliament  helped  to  supplement  them  in  relation to 
the  excluded  sectors  and  services.  This  considerable  freedom  is offset by  a 
requirement  of  transparency:  the  criteria  applied  must  be  stated  in  the 
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of importance. 
2.  Procedure in the case of abnormally  low tenders 
The  unchanged  Article  25(5)  of  the  supplies  directive  stipulates  that  where 
'tenders  are  obviously  abnormally  low'  the  contracting  authority  shall 
ex~ine the details of  the  tenders  before  deciding to whom  it will  award  the 
contract and request the tenderer to furnish the necessary explanations. 
The  public works directive,  previously similar to the  supplies directive,  has 
been tightened up  (Article 29(5)).  If tenders  'appear to be abnormally low', 
the  contracting  authority  'shall  request,  in  writing,  details  of  the 
constituent  elements  of  the  tender  which  it  considers  relevant'.  Four 
possible justifications are now  proposed:  economy  of the construction method, 
or  the technical  solutions chosen,  or the exceptionally favourable  conditions 
available  to  the  tenderer,  or  the  originality  of  the  work  proposed  by  the 
tenderer.  Under  both  directives  the  Commission  must  be  informed  of  any 
rejections. 
In  the  excluded  sectors directive,  which  follows  the  public  works  directive 
closely  on  this  point,  the  novelty  is  the  specific  reference  to  state 
subsidies  as  a  possible  justification  provided  these  comply  with  the  rules 
stipulated  by  Article  93(3)  of  the  Treaty.  Here  too,  the  Commission  must  be 
informed of the rejection of any such tenders.  The  same  arrangements are laid 
down  in the proposed public services directive. 
3.  Preferences 
<a>  Regional preferences 
Article  26  of  the  supplies  directive  and  Article  29a  of  the  public  works 
directive  are  innovations  resulting  from  amenc:lments  by  the  European 
Parliament,  which  always  gives  a  high  priority  to  regional  issues.  These 
articles  allow  existing  national  provisions  on  the  award  of  public  works 
contracts  to  continue  to  be  applied  if  they  have  as  their  objective  the 
reduction of regional disparities and the promotion of  job creation in regions 
whose  development  is lagging behind  and  in declining  industrial regions.  The 
national  provisions  must  however  be  compatible  with  the  Treaty  and  the 
Community's  international obligations. 
The  Commission  itself  inserted  this  provision  in  Article  28(2)  of  the 
directive on  public procurement  in the excluded sectors,  making it applicable 
until  31  December  1992.  The  same  time  limit  was  also  stipulated  in  the 
proposal  for  a  directive on services.  However,  since the time limit is likely 
to be  exceeded  by the decision-making procedure  and with the court of Justice 
having  in  its  Du  Pont  de  Nemours  judgment  declared  the  Italian  regional 
preferential  scheme  incompatible  with  Article  30  of  the  Treaty,  the  European 
Parliament preferred to delete it. 
<b>  community preferences 
This  provision  (Article  29),  which  is  unique  to  ·the  excluded  sectors 
directive,  is  designed  to  ensure  that  the  Community  cannot  open  its markets 
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procurement.  It therefore stipulates that any offer may  be rejected when  more 
than half  the. value of the products is not of  Community origin  (paragraph 2). 
In  addition,  the  contracting authorities  must  give  preference to  a  COmmunity 
ter-~·~er  where  two  or  more  tenders  are  equivalent,  i.e.  where  the  price 
difference  does  not  exceed  3'  (Article  29(3).  These  provisions will evolve 
in  accordance  with  the  outcome  of  negotiations  with  third  countries  seeking 
equivalent treatment,  as in the case of the GATT  negotiations. 
Article  40(4)  of  the  public  service  proposal  for  a  directive  lays  down  a 
procedure  that  may  be  used  to  restrict  access  to  Community  contracts  for 
tenders  from  undertakings  in  third  countries  that  do  not  grant  Community 
undertakings  equitable  access  to  their  contracts  in  accordance  with  the 
conditions laid down  in Article 40(3). 
B.  The probleaa of technical standards 
The  imprint of the European Parliament is unmistakeable in this area. 
The  ~lies  directive  (Article  7(2))  places  an obligation on the contracting 
authorities  to  define  technical  specifications  'by  reference  to  national 
standards  implementing  European  standards'  or  'legally  binding  national 
technical  rules  insofar  as  these  are  compatible  with  Community  law' 
(amendments  by  Parliament).  There  are  four  possibilities,  laid down  by  the 
European  Parliament  (paragraph 3),  for departing  from this principle.  In the 
absence of the standards  laid down  in Article 7(2),  the  replacement  standards 
are,  by  order  of  preference:  the  national  standards  of  the  country  of  the 
contracting  authority  transposing  international  standards;  other  national 
standards  of  that  same  country;  any  other  standard  (paragraph  5)  (stipulated 
on  an  amendment  by  the  European  Parliament).  Lastly  (paragraph  6)  standards 
that  could  have  the  effect  of  introducing  compartmentalization  of  the 
Community  market  (the  indication  of  trade  marks,  patents,  types  or  specific 
origin or production,  etc.)  are prohibited unless  justified by the  subject of 
the contract. 
Article  10  of  the  public works  directive,  which,  as  a  result of the European 
Parliament's  amendments,  is  very  close  to  the  equivalent  provisions  in  the 
supplies directive,  differs  from  the latter on  two  points  in particular:  the 
reference to  'European technical approvals'  (European Parliament amendment)  is 
added  to  paragraph  2,  together  with  certain  new  replacement  standards, 
including  national  standards  recognized  in  accordance  with  the  availability 
requirements listed in the directives relating to technical harmonization. 
Article  13  of  the  excluded  sectors  directive  is  an  amalgamation  of  the 
provisions  of  the  other  two  directives,  the  technical  specifications  being 
defined by reference to European specifications  (paragraph 2)  and,  where these 
do  not  exist,  by  reference  to  other  standards  having  currency  within  the 
Community  (paragraph  3).  The  article  stipulates  a  clear  preference  for 
specifications  that  indicate  performance  requirements  (paragraph  4).  The 
relevant  provisions  of  the  existing  directives  concerning  the  use  of 
harmonized  standards  are  also  applicable  to  public  service  procurement 
(Article  16).  However,  products  used  in public  sector  procurement  are often 
of  only  marginal  interest  to  the  contracting  authority.  Article  16  ( 2)  is 
consequently  only  appropriate  when  the  contracting  authorities  consider  it 
necessary to specify the technical characteristics of products. 
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The  different  sectors  are  clearly  differentiated  from  each  other  .in  this 
respect. 
1.  'Ex-ante'  information 
<al  Periodic indicative notice 
The  supplies  directive  (Article  9(1))  stipulates  that  the  contracting 
authorities  'shall  make  known  •••  as  soon  as  possible after the beginning of 
their budgetary year,  by  means  of  an  indicative notice,  the total procurement 
by  product  area of which the estimated value,  •••  is equal to or greater than 
ECU  750  000  and which they envisage awarding during the coming twelve months'. 
This  information is to be rapidly published in the Official Journal  (deadlines 
stipulated) • 
The  public  works  directive  contains  some  differences  (Article  12 ( 1) ) •  The 
value  of  the  works  is  the  same  as  the  threshold  for  the  application of  the 
directive,  and the  'essential characteristics' of the markets are specified in 
the  indicative  notice.  The  European  Parliament,  which  is partly responsible 
for  this  provision,  rejected  any  exceptions  to  the  publication  of  such  a 
notice. 
Article  17  of  the  excluded  sectors  directive  combines  these  provisions  but 
does not stipulate any time limit. 
The  services directive includes the corresponding provisions  from the supplies 
directive  with  the  identical  threshold:  ECU  750  000  by  category of  service 
(Article 17(1)). 
<bl  Non-periodical prior information 
The  1n1ppl.les  and  works  directives  (Article  9(2)  and  Article  12(2) 
respectively)  require publication  (with the same  deadline as  for the periodic 
notice)  of  a  notice  in  which  the  contracting  authorities  make  known  their 
intention to  award  a  public  supply  contract.  The  sole  exemption  is for  the 
negotiated  procedure  without  recourse  to  competition.  These  notices  are 
required  to  contain  extensive  and  essential  information  about  the  contracts 
concerned  (selection,  standards,  etc.). 
The  excluded  sectors  directive  (Article  16)  provides  for  three  types  of 
indicative  notice:  a  compulsory  invitation  to  tender  in  the  case  of  open 
procedures  (paragraph  1),  an  optional  invitation  to  tender  in  the  case  of 
restricted  and  negotiated  procedures  with  prior  opening  up  to  competition 
(paragraph  2(a))  and  invitation  to  qualified  tenderers  by  virtue  of  a 
qualification  system  laid  down  in  Article  23  and  itself  having  been  the 
subject  of  a  specific  notice  (cf.  Article 24,  (5)  and  (6)).  Every effort is 
made  to  maintain  competition  while  adhering  to  standard  practices  in  these 
sectors.  No  time  limit  for  publi~ation is stipulated,  and the notice itself 
is less informative,  preference being given to notification on request. 
The  proposed  services directive requires publication of  a  notice  in which the 
contracting  authorities  make  known  their  intention  to  award  a  contract  by 
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(Article  17 (2)).  The  same  applies  to  the  award  of  a  public  service 
concession and the organizing of a  contest  (Article 17(3)  and  (4)). 
2.  'Ex post'  information 
Cal  Justification by written report 
The  auppl.iea  and  110rka  directives  (Article  6(6)  and  Article  Sa(S) 
respectively))  require  written  reports to  be  drawn  up.  These  reports,  to be 
forwarded to the Commission at its request,  are required to justify the use of 
the  negotiated  procedure,  with  or  without  prior  opening  up  to  competition, 
including that of  the  restricted procedure  for  public  supply  contracts.  The 
obligation  to  provide  justifications  in  these  documents  offsets  the 
flexibility  of  certain  criteria  for  the  use  of  these  procedures.  The  same 
applies in the proposed services directive  (Article 14(3)). 
(b)  Notice of the results of procedures 
The  supplies  (Article 9(3)),  110rks  (Article 12(5)),  excluded sectors  (Article 
18)  directives  and  the  proposal  on  services  (Article  18)  contain  equivalent 
provisions  concerning  publication  in  the  Official  Journal  of  a  notice 
announcing  the  outcome  of  every  contract  award  to  be  sent  not  later than  48 
days  after the award  of the contract.  A derogation is provided in respect of 
'sensitive'  information. 
Ccl  Notification on request 
The  works  directive  (Article  Sa(1)  and  (2))  requires,  in  what  represents 
significant progress compared with the new  supplies directive,  which does not, 
that  the  contracting  authority  indicate,  at  the  request  of  any  candidate  or 
tenderer,  either the reasons  for the rejection of an application or tender and 
the  name  of  the  successful  tenderer,  or the  grounds  on  which it decided  not 
to award  a  contract in respect of which  a  prior call for competition was  made, 
or  to  recommence  the  procedure.  The  Office  of Official  Publications of  the 
Community  must  also  be  informed.  The  European  Parliament  helped  in 
formulating these stipulations. 
Equivalent  provisions  are  contained  in  the  excluded  sectors  for  a  directive 
concerning  the  system  of  qualifications  for  tenderer&  (Article  24)  and  in 
Article 14 of the services proposal. 
3.  Time  limits for procedures 
These time limits,  particularly those concerning receipt of tenders,  have been 
extended  considerably  in  the  supplies  (Article  10)  and  works  (Article  13) 
directives. 
In the case of the ezcluded sectors the directive  simply  stipulates a  minimum 
compulsory  time  limit  (10  days)  and  an  average  indicative deadline  (3  weeks), 
while  leaving it open  to the  contracting parties to fix  time  limits by  joint 
agreement,  with any  form of discrimination between tenderers,  of course,  being 
prohibited  (Article 20). 
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works  directive  (71/305/EEC)  shall  be  applicable  in this  connection  (Article 
19). 
To  conclude,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  works  directive  represents 
significant  progress  on  a  number  of  points  over  the  supplies directive;  are 
there  therefore  lessons  to  be  learnt  for  the  latter?  As  to  the  excluded 
sectors,  the  arrangements  adopted are often the consequence  of their specific 
economic characteristics,  although the  idea of progress is also present  here. 
The  services proposal for a  directive,  which is directly based on the existing 
public procurement directives,  has made  some  changes  in this area to allow for 
the  specific  nature  of  services  by  comparison  with  works  and  supplies.  But 
the effectiveness  of  these  instruments  will  depend  on  there  being  guaranteed 
remedies  for tenderers harmed  by an infringement. 
II.  RBVIBW  PROCBDURBS  Aim  RBMBDIBS 
Directive  89/665/EEC  on  the  coordination  of  the  laws,  regulations  and 
administrative  provisions relating to the application of  review procedures to 
the  award  of  public  supply  and  public  works  contracts  was  the  subject of the 
cooperation  procedure  with  the  European  Parliaments  and  was  adopted  by  the 
Council on  21  December  198968• 
The  Member  States  are  required to  implement  the  measures  necessary to comply 
with the  new  'remedies'  directive before  21  December  1991  (Article 5).  By  21 
December  1995,  the  Commission,  in consultation with  the  appropriate  advisory 
conmittee,  will  reconsider  the  text  adopted  and  propose,  where  appropriate, 
any  amendments  considered necessary  (Article 4). 
In  July  1990  the  commission  submitted  a  proposal69  laying  down  review 
procedures  for  the  excluded  sectors.  An  amended  proposal70  was  submitted on 
4  June  1991  - under  the cooperation procedure  - taking  a  number  of amendments 
by  Parliament  into  account.  These  amendments  distinguished  in  particular 
between  redress  for  violation of  the  directive  on  the excluded  sectors  and  a 
mechanism  providing  general  proof  of  compliance  with  the  directive  (the 
attestation  scheme).  By  1  January  1993  the  Member  States will  have  to  have 
adopted  the  measures  necessary  for  implementing  the  new  directive  (with 
derogations  for  Spain,  Portugal  and  Greece  - Article  14) •  By  analogy  with 
ra.dies  Directive  89/665/EEC,  the  proposal  stipulates  a  procedure  for  a 
review of the  implementation of the directive not  later than  four years after 
the application of that directive  (Article 13).  on  8  June  1991  the Council of 
Ministers  reached  an  agreement  in  principle  on  the  adoption  of  a  common 
position on the amended  proposal. 
A.  The reasons for these directives 
Different reasons lie behind the drawing up of these directives: 
68  OJ  No.  L  395,  30.12.1989,  pp.  33-35. 
69  COM(90)  297  final,  30.7.1990,  OJ c  216,  31.8.1990 
70  COM(91)  158 final,  4.6.1991 
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of the Treaty)  is ponderous  and  slow and applies only to the Member  States. 
- The  procedures  for the  award of  procurement contracts  (cf.  point  I)  contain 
no provisions for guaranteeing their effective implementation; 
- The  ways  and  means  of  securing  redress  are  very  different  according  to 
Member  State and there are  sometimes  major  lacunae resulting in differences 
in treatment of tenderers and participants in award procedures. 
- Looking  ahead  to  the  opening  up  of  public  procurement  to  Community 
competition it is essential  for  effective  and  rapid  means  of redress to be 
in  place  in  the  event  of  violations  of  Community  law  or  national  rules 
incorporating that law. 
B.  Content of the directives 
1.  SCope of implementation  (Article 1) 
The  award  procedures  concerned  (Article  1(1))  fall  within  the  scope  of 
amended  Directives  71/305/EEC  and  77/62/EEC  as  described  above.  The  proposal 
for  a  directive on public service procurement stipulates  (Article 41)  that the 
latter are covered by the existing review procedures directive. 
The  amended  proposal of  4  June  1991  applies to all  'excluded'  sectors  (water, 
energy,  transport and telecommunications- Article 1(1))  and  includes in those 
same  articles the provisions already  implemented  under the  r  dies Directive 
89/665/EEC.  The  remedy  must  be effective and rapid and relate to decisions in 
violation  of  Community  law  on  public  procurement  or  national  rules 
implementing  that  law  (paragraph  1).  Paragraph  2  requires  the Member  States 
to ensure that there is no  discrimination as  a  result of the distinction made 
between national and Community  rules. 
Paragraph  3  stipulates  that  the  review  procedures  must  be  available,  under 
detailed rules which the Member  States may  establish,  'at least' to any person 
having  or  having  had  an  interest  in obtaining  a  particular public  supply  or 
public works contract and risks being harmed  by an alleged infringement.  This 
wording  allows  subcontractors  for  example  the  option  of  adding  their  own 
complaint to that of the principal undertaking.  The  Member  States may  require 
that  the  person  seeking  the  review.  must  have  previously  notified  the 
contracting authority of the alleged infringement  and of his intention to seek 
review. 
2.  Creation,  strengthening and coordination of review procedures  (Article 2) 
The  powers  and bodies responsible for the reviews are empowered to: 
(l)  take interim measures with the aim of correcting the alleged infringement 
including  measures  to  suspend  the  award  procedure  (paragraph  1a).  The 
effect of such measures  need not necessarily be automatic. 
(2)  to  set  aside  decisions  taken  unlawfully 
discriminatory,  technical,  economic  or 
(paragraph.lb). 
(3)  to award  damages  (paragraph lc). 
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(including  the  removal  of 
financial  specifications) Parliament's contribution to the amended  proposal on the excluded sectors 
includes  authorizing  the  body  responsible  for  the  review  procedures  to 
choose  between  measures  (1)  and  (2)  above  and  other  measures  having  an 
equivalent  effect,  including  the  payment  of  a  given  sum  of  money 
(paragraph  1(c)).  The  choice  is  open  either  to  the  contracting 
authorities as  a  whole  or to only  some  of them.  Article 2(5)  stipulates 
that  the  sum  of  money  payable  must  be  fixed  at  a  deterrent  level. 
Whatever option is chosen,  the measures taken under the review procedures 
must  provide  for  the  option  of  awarding  damages  to persons  harmed  by  an 
infringement  (paragraph l(d)). 
The  bodies  responsible  for  review  procedures  may,  but  need  not  be, 
judicial  in  character.  However  in  the  latter  case,  Artice  2 (8)  of 
Directive  89/665/EEC  and  Article  2(10)  of  the  amended  proposal  on  the 
excluded  sectors  stipulate that guarantees of equivalent procedures  must 
be  given.  Consequently·,  the  decisions  of  non-judicial  bodies  must  be 
accompanied  by  written  reasons,  the  option  of  a  judicial  review  must 
always  be  open  and  conditions  are  also  laid  down  for  the  appointment  of 
members  of  these  bodies  and  their qualifications.  These  guarantees  are 
the  result  of  amendments  by  the  European  Parliament  which  strongly 
influenced the drafting of the texts as  a  whole. 
The  effects  of  the  exercise  of  powers  by  the  bodies  responsible  are 
determined  by  national  law  (Article  2 (6)  of  Directive  89/665/EEC  and 
Article 2(7)· of the amended  proposal on the excluded sectors).  It is for 
the  Member  States  to  ensure  that  decisions  taken  by  bodies  responsible 
for  review  procedures  can  be  effectively  enforced  (Article  2(7)  of 
Directive  89/665/EEC  and  Article  2(9)  of  the  amended  proposal  on  the 
excluded sectors). 
The  decision to take interim measures must take into account the probable 
consequences  of  the  measures  for_ all  interests  likely to  be  harmed  as 
well  as  the  public  interest.  Where  it  appears  that  the  negative 
consequences of such measures could exceed the benefits,  the decision may 
be  taken  not  to  grant  such  measures  (paragraph  4).  However,  any  such 
decision  shall  not  prejudice  any  other  claim  (where  a  decision  must  be 
set aside prior to the  award  of  damages).  Where  damages  are claimed  on 
the  grounds  that  a  decision  was  taken  unlawfully,  the  Member  States may 
stipulate that  that  decision  shall  be  set  aside  prior to  an  award  by  a 
body  authorized  to  make  that  decision.  In  such  cases  it  may  be 
stipulated  that  the  powers  of  the  body  responsible  for  the  review 
procedures  shall  be  limited  to  awarding  damages  (Article  2 ( 6),  second 
subparagraph,  Directive  89/665/EEC  and  Article  2(7)  of  the  amended 
proposal on the excluded sectors). 
Moreover,  the  amended  proposal  on  the  review  procedures  in the  excluded 
sectors  (paragraph  8)  stipulates  that  a  person  making  a  claim  for 
damages  shall  not  be  required  to  prove  that  he  would  have  been  awarded 
the  contract  but  only  that  there  has  been  an  infringement  of  Community 
law  and  that  the  infringement  adversely  affected  his  chances  of  being 
awarded  the  contract.  The  basis  of  the  claim consists primarily not  in 
having been denied the award of the contract but of having been prevented 
from  competing  on  equal  terms  for  its award.  This  fully reflects one of 
the  principal  objectives  of  the  directives  intended  to  open  up  public 
procurement,  namely  equitable  organization  of  the  award  procedures. 
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considered,  it  can  be  more  difficult  for  private  persons  to  secure  an 
effective interim measure,  hence the importance of relaxing the burden of 
proof. 
There  are  thus  evident  similarities  between  the  review  procedures  laid 
down  in Directive 89/665/EEC  and those  featuring  in the  amended  proposal 
on review procedures in the excluded sectors. 
3.  COOperation between the COIIIIlission  and the llelllber States 
The  relevant  provisions  are  identical  in  Directive  89/665/EEC  and  in  the 
amended  proposal  on  the  excluded  sectors.  They  feature  in Article  3  and 
Article  9  respectively.  It  should  be  pointed  out  that  in  the  amended 
proposal of  June  1991  these provisions  are contained  in Chapter  3  entitled 
'corrective  mechanism'.  Parliament  tabled  an  amendment  aimed  at 
strengthening  this  corrective  mechanism.  The  Commission  refused  to  adopt 
the  amendment  in  its  amended  proposal  on  the  ground  that it would  entail 
excessive costs. 
If  the  Commission  considers,  before  conclusion  of  the  contract,  that  a 
clear  and  evident  infringement  of  Community  provisions  relating  to  the 
award  of  public  sector  procurement  contracts  has  been  committed,  it may 
invoke  the  procedure  stipulated  in the directives.  In that case it shall 
notify  the  Member  State  and  the  contracting  authority  of  its reasons  for 
considering  that  a  clear  infringement  exists  and  ask  for  it  to  be 
corrected. 
Within  21  days  of  receipt  of  the  notification,  the  Member  State concerned 
shall communicate to the Commission: 
(a)  its confirmation that the infringement has been corrected;  or 
(b)  a  reasoned submission as to why  no correction has been made.  This may 
rely on the fact that the alleged  infringement  is already the subject 
of  judicial  review  proceedings.  In  such  a  case,  the  Member  State 
shall inform the Commission of the result of those proceedings as  soon 
as it becomes  known. 
(c)  a  notice  to  the  effect  that  the  contract  award  procedure  has  been 
suspended  if a  review  is already  in progress.  The  Member  State must 
also inform the Commission of the result of the suspension. 
It  is  also  open  to  the  Commission  to  initiate  infringement  proceedings 
under  the  Treaty  (Article  169)  by  bringing the  matter before the Court  of 
Justice  and  applying  for  the  procedure  to  be  suspended  (cf.  La  Spezia 
Case,  European Court of Justice). 
4.  Specific provisions for review procedures in the excluded sectors 
In addition to the  system of  remedies at national  level  and the corrective 
mechanism,  the  amended  proposal  on  the  excluded  sectors  also  provides  for 
an  attestation  system  and  a  conciliation  procedure.  The  special  features 
of the sectors considered and of the national  legal systems under which the 
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in the proposal. 
(a)  'lhe attestation system 
Introduced  for  the  first  time  in  the  Conmunity's  public-sector  procurement 
arrangements,  this  is  a  form  of  control  intended  to  supplement  existing 
internal  controls.  Its  purpose  is  to  ensure  mutual  confidence  between  the 
interested parties by  providing  independent  confirmation that the  systems  for 
awarding  contracts  are  equitable  and  non-discriminatory  and  that  they  take 
account of the obligations  imposed by Community  law. 
The  proposal  covers  only  the  essential  features  of  the  attestation  system 
(Articles 3  to 8)  and does not go into detail.  It stipulates  (Article 4)  that 
attestation  must  be  carried  out  at  least  once  a  year  by  an  authorized 
attestor,  thereby  providing  an  ongoing  and  effective  assessment  of  contract 
award  procedures  and  practices.  The  attestor&  must  submit  a  written  report 
(Article  5)  and  their  appointment  or  dismissal  must  be  subject to guarantees 
of  independence and professional competence  (Articles  6  and 7). 
(b)  Conciliation procedure 
The  proposal  on  review  procedures  in  the  excluded  sectors  provides  for  a 
conciliation procedure at Community  level  (Chapter 4,  Articles 10,  11  and 12). 
This  leaves  it open  to  the  parties  concerned  to settle their differences  by 
mutual  agreement.  The  procedure  laid  down  is flexible,  rapid  and  effective. 
Nor  does  it  entail  prejudice  to  the  rights  of  those  who  are  parties  to 
proceedings under the review procedure. 
C.  Conclusion 
The  arrangements  for  review  procedures  for  the  award  of  public contracts for 
supplies  and  public  works  on  the one  hand  and  for  services  on  the  other  are 
consequently  very  similar.  They  are  intended  to ensure  practical  compliance 
with  Community  rules  on  contract  award  procedures  and  the  attainment  of 
Community  objectives  in  this  area.  The  amended  proposal  on  the  excluded 
sectors,  however,  also contains  features  not  included in Directive 89/665  and 
which  take  into  account  the  special  nature  of  the  bodies  operating  in these 
sectors  from the economic,  technical and  legal points of view. 
DOC  EN\RESRCH\117748  - 61  -PARr 3:  ADLYSIS OP  '!niB DIBriRG SI'!UAriml  D  PUBLIC  SBc.rOR 
PROCORBMD'l  IR 'riiB IIBHBBR  ftATBS 
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It is first necessary to point out that this analysis neither seeks nor  cla~s 
to be exhaustive. 
One  of the difficulties in seeking to draw  up  an  exact and detailed study has 
been  the  paucity  of  relevant  documents.  This  is  probably  due  to  the 
'sensitive'  nature  of  the  subject  considered,  but  also  to  the  novelty  of 
Co~unity dlrectives on this subject. 
Morovr  .  .: 1  (he  documentation  provided  by  the  different  Member  States,  highly 
unev~-~  :  ..  --.  terms  of  distribution  and  content,  was  not  sufficient to allow the 
situ  a':.: en  prevailing  in  the  various  member  countries  to  be  described 
obj~cc~vely and equitably. 
We  have nevertheless sought to provide as wide-ranging and clear an  account as 
possible  of  the  existing  situation  on  the  basis  of  the  resources  currently 
available. 
I.  TRARSPOSITIOR  OP  COMKtJIIIft  DIRBCTIVBS 
A.  Rational legislation enacting coa.unity legislation 
1.  Deadlines for transposition 
We  sh  l  confine  ourselves  to the  enactment  in  national  law  of  the  supplies 
(88/2  and  public  works  (89/444).  Directives,  fixed  in  those  texts  at 
1.1.!~69  and  19.7.1989  respectively.  Spain,  Greece  and  Portugal  have 
derogA.ions until 1  March  1992  in respect of these two  amended directives,  but 
are  required  to  ~plement  the  original  directives  (77/62  and  71/305). 
Implementation  of  the  other,  more  recent  directives  is  stipulated  for  later 
dates,  viz.: 
1  January  1992  for  the proposal  for  a  directive on  public service contract 
award procedures, 
1  July  1992  for  the  amended  proposal  for  a  directive on  review procedures 
in the excluded sectors; 
21  December  1992  for  the  directive  on  review  procedures  for  public  works 
and  supply contracts; 
1  January  1993  for  the  directive  on  contract  award  procedures  in  the 
excluded sectors. 
2 •  References 
The  table  below  sets  out,  where  available,  the  references  for  legislation 
enacted  in the different  Member  States  implementing  the  two  amended  supplies 
and public works directives. 
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 B.  Monitoring of transposition 
The  above  table  clearly  shows  the  diversity of  the  legislative means  used  by 
the  member  countries  to  enact  the  Community  supplies  and  public  works 
directives under national  law. 
1.  The  problems raised 
The  enactment  of  these  directives  as  national  law  undoubtedly  introduces  a  I 
number  of  problems.  Firstly,  in its VIIIth  report to the European  Parliament, 
on  the  application  of  Community  law,  the  Commission  refers  to  the  delays  in  jl 
enacting  national  legislation  affecting  implementation  of  the  new  directives. 
Moreover,  the  national  enactment  measures  introduced  in certain Member  Statesl 
are irregular.  The  United Kingdom,  Ireland and Denmark  for example resorted to 
implementation by  administrative circular,  and this method  was  not  approved  by 
the  Commission.  Lastly,  some  member  countries  have  still  not  notified  the 
Commission of the national transposition provisions they have chosen. 
The  VIIIth  report  gives  details  of  the  proceedings  that  the  Commission  has 
instituted against certain member  countries  in monitoring transposition of the 
directives. 
2.  The  infringements discovered 
Although  Spain,  Greece  and  Portuaal  are  not  required  to  implement  the  tw 
amended  directives  until  1  March  1992,  they  were  supposed  to  have  introduce 
national measures  enacting the  two  original directives.  In fact,  however,  th 
Commission  has brought proceedings in accordance with Article 169  of the Treat 
against  Spain  for  the  non-comformity  of  national  measures  implementin 
Directives  71/305/EEC  and  77/62/EEC.  In addition,  Portugal  is now  the subjec 
of  a  reasoned  opinion  for  failing  to  notify  the  Commission  of  its  nationa 
measures  transposing Directive  77/62/EEC.  other Member  States not entitled t 
the  derogation  have  also  been  the  subject  of  proceedings.  I.n  the  case  o~ 
transposition  of  the  new  supplies  directive  (88/295/EEC),  the  Commission  baa 
initiated proceedings  against  Italy  and  the  Netherlands  for  failing to notifl 
it of the relevant measures. 
In  addition,  the  Commission  has  written  to  the  Member  States  asking  them  tc 
inform it of their national transposition measures.  In general  there has bee1 
a  satisfactory  response  to  this  communication,  except  from  Luxembourg,  th• 
Netherlands  and Italy. 
Thus,  transposition of the two  amended  directives on supplies and public works. 
which  strictly  speaking  should  have  been  effected  by  1  January  1989  and  11 
July  1989  respectively,  is still incomplete.  The  Member  States  have tended t( 
delay  the  enactment  of  national  legislation,  and  when  it has  finally  appeare1 
it has not always been in the most  appropriate  form. 
It is  evident  that  no  real  change  can  be  expected  in the  situation until th 
complete  set  of  directives  relating  to  public  procurement  has  been  correctl 
incorporated in the national  legislations of  the different  member  countries  i 
such  a  way  as to ensure that every facility necessary  for  a  genuine opening u 
of public procurement within the Community  is available to those countries. 
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A.  Obstacles to implementation 
1.  The  diversity of methods of organization 
The  implementation  of  Community  directives  on  public  p~::)curement  has  been 
hampered  by the fact that procurement is a  sensitive and complex area dominated 
by.the prevailing national traditions71 • 
In  particular  the  methods  of  organizing  public  procurement  differ 
significantly  from  one  country to another,  ranging  from  intense centralization 
to complete decentralization of the public purchasing departments72 • 
As  is  pointed  out  below,  the  indicative  list  of  administrative  bodies 
responsible  for  public-sector  purchasing  in eight  Member  States  is of  greater 
or lesser length depending on.the country,  and the public bodies themselves are 
not necessarily identical. 
Belgium: 
the state; 
the regions of Flanders,  Wallonia  and Brussels; 
the  Flemish-speaking  community,  the  French-speaking  community  and  the 
German-speaking community; 
the provinces; 
local authorities and associations of local authorities; 
state universities  and  other public  law  institutions or undertakings  (SNCB, 
etc.); 
subsidized  private  colleges  and  universities,  legal  persons  in  whom  the 
authorities  hold  a  'preponderant  interest'  and  certain  legal  persons 
subsidized by the public authorities. 
Denmark: 
State,  local authorities,  hospitals and certain schools. 
There  are  no  specific  rules  on  public  procurement  as  such  in  Denmark.  The 
rules applicable are confined to those laid down  at Community  level. 
Britain: 
The  greater  part  of  public-sector  procurement  is  contracted  by  certain  large 
departments:  the Ministries of Defence,  Health,  the Environment,  Transport  and 
Agriculture. 
Greece: 
The  Ministry  of  Trade  and  Ministry  of  Industry,  together  with  various  state 
bodies,  including the  PPC,  OTE,  EAS,  IKA,  etc.  The  Ministry of  Commerce  draws 
71  See  G.  Guisolphe  and  Th.  Vinois  - 'L'ouverture  des  marches  publics  l 
l'horizon 1993'.  Commission  of the European Communities. 
72  s.  Belujon  and  P.  Posquet,  Moniteur  du  Commerce  International,  Paris,  20 
January 1986,  p.  28.  See also Annex  I  to Directives 88/295  and 89/440. 
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bodies. 
In the case of public works:  the Ministry of Public Works. 
Ireland: 
Government  ministries,  and  in  particular  the  Defence  and  Environment 
,Ministries,  whose  purchasing  sections  also  act  on  behalf  of  other 
1  departments; 
state-sponsored  bodieEr,  the  most 
sector procurement are: 
important  of  which  in  terms  of  public-, 
I 
*  Electricity Supply Board 
*  Bord Gaia Eireann  (supply and distribution of natural gas) 
*  Gaelic  (Telecommunications) 
*  Coras  Iompair Eireann  (road and rail transport) 
*  Aer Rianta  (airport management) 
*  Aer Lingua  (national airline) 
*  Radio Telefis Eireann  (national radio and  TV  network) 
*  An  Post  (post office) 
*  Local authorities  (county councils,  county borough corporations) 
*  Regional health boards 
*  Harbour authorities 
*  the universities. 
Italy: 
Central  government,  and regional,  provincial  and  local authorities,  as well  as 
public  and  quasi-public  bodies  associated  with  those  authorities  are 
concerned. 
Purchases  by  the  Ministry  of  Defence  account  for  more  than  60'  of  Italian 
public procurement. 
The  Provveditorato  Generale  dello  Stato,  which  answers  to  the  Treasury 
Ministry,  is responsible for providing the equipment and services necessary for 
the operation of civilian administrative departments of state. 
Netherlands: 
The  'Rijksinkoopbureau  (RIB)'  is the  central  body  responsible  for  purchasing 
equipment  and  services  for  government  departments.  In  1984  it  processed 
centralized  orders  to  a  value  of  nearly  ECU  1.159,Sm.  More  than  half  the 
purchases  whose  procurement  needs  were  processed  by  the  RIB  were  in  the 
education  sector.  Even  so,  a  number  of  administrative  bodies  (universities, 
hospitals,  local  authority  departments)  also  make  direct  purchases.  These 
account  for  about 80' of total public procurement. 
The  'Rijksgebouwendienst'  is responsible for equipping the different government 
depar·. ·  ~ts  throughout  ··he  country:  construction,  renovation  and  maintenance, 
init;  ..:J.tting out an,  '.lrnishing of premises. 
The  Ministry  of  Defence  buys  all  military  equipment  and  all  other  materials 
required by the armed  forces. 
There are also two  departments that answer to the postal authorities: 
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I the  Royal  Automobile  Centre  (RAC)  which  buys  all  vehicles  for  the 
government,  except  for  the  Ministries  of  Defence,  Justice,  Agriculture  and 
the Department responsible for Polders; 
the  Office  Machine  Agency  (KMC),  which  is  responsible  for  purchasing  all 
forms  of data-processing equipment. 
Germany: 
In all cases: 
all  Federal  Government  and  Land  Government  Ministries,  government 
departments  directly  answerable  to  them,  and  all  local  public  authorities 
(district and  local authorities); 
the  posts  and  telecommunications  authority  (Bundespost),  Federal  Railways 
(Bundesbahn),  the  armed  forces  (Bundeswehr)  and  the  frontier  security 
forces  (Bundesgrenzschutz)i 
a  good  number  of  public-law  establishments,  the  universities,  higher 
educational  establishments,  and  research  institutes  financed  by  public 
funds. 
For complex operations: 
operations carried out by port authorities 
on  a  case-by-case basis: 
bodies  responsible  for  local  distribution  of  energy  supplies  and  local-
authority services. 
2.  Disparities in review procedures 
These coincide with the disparities that can be observed within national review 
procedures.  We  have  already  pointed  out  that  the  remedies  directive 
(89/665/EEC),  which  is  supposed  to come  into  force  in December  1992  is one  of 
the  pillars  of  the  public  procurement  liberalisation  policy  since  it  will 
ensure  implementation  and  monitoring  of  the  supplies  and  public  works 
directives.  Yet  to this day  the  national  review procedures  applicable to the 
award  of  public  procurement  contracts  still  vary  widely  from  one  country  to 
another73• 
All  the  Member  States  have  administrative  review  procedures  for  the  award  of 
public procurement  contracts,  but the terms  of reference of the administrative 
bodies responsible can vary widely from  one country to another. 
In  all  Member  States  the  authorities  may,  on  application  by  an  undertaking 
whose  rights  have  been  infringed,  take  corrective  measures  in  notices  of 
invitation  to  tender  if  these  contain  unlawful  or  incorrect  specifications 
(Article  2b  of  Directive  89/665/EEC).  The  option  of  suspending  the  decision 
awarding the contract is available to the administrative authorities only  in a 
73  see  Flamme,  Cleary,  Gottlieb,  Steen  and  Hamilton.  Extracts  from  the 
analysis  of  controls  on  compliance  with  the  rules  concerning  public 
procurement  in  the  Member  States.  Commission  of  the  European  Communities. 
Consultative  Committee  on  the  liberalization  of  public-sector  procurement, 
information  document  on  ways  and  means  of  securing  the review of  awards  of 
public  procurement  contracts  in  the  Member  States  of  the  Community 
(EC/90/68). 
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the  Netherlands)  it  appears  that this  option  is  available,  but  there  are  as 
yet no precedents. 
Similarly  the  settin-;r  aside  of  the  decision  awarding  the  contract  is  not 
guaranteed  in  all  th·:::- Member  States  (in  Greece) •  The  possibility  of  direct 
compensation  to  undertakings  whose  rights  have  been  infringed  by  government 
departments  is  available  only  in  Denmark  and  Spain  and  is  hardly  ever 
implemented.  Legal traditions and case  law have devolved quite different terms 
of  reference  from  one  Member  State  to  another  upon  judicial authorities that 
are themselves  fundamentally different in each Member  State,  resulting in major 
differences in the procedures necessary to secure redress. 
In  the  Danish  system,  for  example,  there  are  no  administrative  courts,  so 
applications  for  review  must  be  lodged  with  the  civil  courts,  whereas  in 
France  such  applications  are  nearly  always  in  the  province  of  the 
administrative courts. 
In  Belgium  a  plaintiff  can  act  simultaneously  in  seeking  conciliation  before 
the  administrative  court  and  in  lodging  a  claim  for  damages  before  a  civil 
court. 
In  the  Netherlands  and  Germany  an  application  for  a  decision to  be  set  aside 
can  be  lodged with  an administrative court,  it having  been established in case 
law that the  award  of  a  public procurement  contract by  a  government  department 
is an act of private law. 
The  United  Kingdom  and  Ireland  have  very  specific  arrangements.  There  are  no 
administrative  courts  but  in  certain  situations  firms  whose  rights  have  been 
infringed  can  bring  on  action  before  the court  on  the  basis  of  either public 
law or private law. 
This  means  that  a  third  party  whose  rights  have  been  infringed  can  apply  t 
the  courts  to  have  a  decision  by  a  contracting authority  set  aside  in  nearl 
all the Member  states except the Netherlands  and Germany. 
Moreover  the  option  of  claiming  damages  is  subject  in  some  Member  States 
(Denmark,  Germany,  United  Kingdom)  to restrictions and  uncertainties that  tend 
to make  it largely theoretical. 
The  options  for  third  parties  to  initiate  review  proceedings  are  also  highl] 
variable,  and in some  Member  States  (Germany,  Spain)  do  not exist at all. 
The  existence of  such  obstacles,  which  one might  call  'regulatory',  i.e.  bounc 
up  with  the  actual  organization  of  public  procurement  and  rooted  in  thE 
historical  context  and  traditions  peculiar to each  country,  has  certainly  no1 
facilitated  implementation  of  the  directives.  our  study  of  the  actuaj 
situation  as  regards  procedures  for  awarding  public procurement  contracts  onl~ 
confirms  that  the  opening  up  of  public  sector  markets  in  the  EuropeaJ 
Community  is far  from  being a  practical reality. 
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1.  Firms'  reluctance to sue 
The  public  procurement  sector is relatively vulnerable to the influence of the 
local  economic  and  political environment  in each  Member  State.  Consequently, 
undertakings that have been discriminated against often hesitate to go to court 
for fear of spoiling their chances of obtaining contracts in the future. 
In  that  connection,  the  Commission's  information  document  shows  that  only 
Italy,  France,  Belgium  and  Luxembourg  have  recorded  a  relatively  high  or 
rising  number  of  cases  brought  by  undertakings.  In  the  other  Member  States 
such  cases  are  either  extremely  rare  or  non-existent.  The  reasons  for  this 
state  of  affairs  may  have  something  to  do  with  the  administrative  and  legal 
review structures described above. 
In  addition,  undertakings  show  a  distinct  lack  of  enthusiasm  in  submitting 
tenders  for  public  procurement  contracts  open  to competition  in  Member  States 
other  than  their  own74,  which  hardly  helps  to  ensure  an  effective 
implementation of the directives. 
2.  The difficulties of effective monitoring 
Apart  from  the  reluctance  of  firms  to  go  to court,  the  difficulties  posed  by 
effective  monitoring  of  public  contract  award  procedures  tend  not  to 
facilitate  practical  implementation  of  the  relevant  directives.  It  often 
happens  with  the  decisions  resulting  from  contract  award  procedures  that 
irregularities  are  committed  by  public-sector  buyers,  sometimes  in  genuine 
ignorance  of  Community  rules  but  sometimes  in  bad  faith  too.  The  following 
examples can be cited75: 
deliberate sub-division of contracts; 
wrongful  use  of  the  negotiation  procedure  in  circumstances  not  stipulated 
in the directives; 
incomplete or misleading  information to undertakings; 
inclusion of discriminatory clauses in tender specifications. 
In  addition,  the  number  of  public-sector  purchasers  - and  the contracts  they 
conclude  - being  extremely  high,  it  is  very  difficult  to  monitor  all  the 
public  contract  awards  in the  Community  as  a  whole.  In  its VIIIth  report  to 
the  European  Parliament  the  Commission  pointed  out  that  it had  been  possible 
to  carry  out  checks  only  on  a  highly  specific  and  ad  hoc  basis  and  that 
independent  specialists  with  whom  a  contract  had  been  concluded  in  1988  had 
analysed  a  number  of  technical  specifications  that  were  liable  to  contain 
infringements. 
In  that  same  report  the  Commission  lists the  different  infringements  relating 
to  public  procurement  considered  in  1990.  Failure  to  comply  with  the 
directives was  broken down  into three main areas: 
interpretation  of  the  scope  of  directives  and  the  excluded  sectors. 
Portugal  (ANA)  and  Germanv  (Duisburg-Ruhrorter  Hafen;  Munich  airport)  were 
served reasoned opinions in this connection; 
74  G.  Grisolphe,  Th.  Vinois,  op.  cit. 
75  Ibid. 
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compelling  reasons  outside  the  meaning  of  the  term  as  defined  in  the 
directives;  this  applied  in  the  case  of  Spain  (University  of  Madrid)  and 
Italy (Institute Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale). 
criteria for  the  award  of contracts;  a  reasoned  opinion was  served.on Italyl 
(Consorzio di Bonifica de  l'Agro Tortole). 
OOBCLUSIOR 
Consequently,  as  things  now  stand  in  the  Member  States  of  the  Community,  a 
sufficient level of protection to ensure genuine  liberalization in the  area of 
public-sector procurement  cannot  be  said to exist.  Problems  arise not only as 
regards  the  transposition  of  the  directives  into  national  legislation,  but 
even  more  in  their  specific  implementation  in  the  various  member  countries. 
However,  certain  developments,  such  as  the  increase  in  the  number  of 
applications  for  review  by ·undertakings  in  certain  Member  States  seem  to 
indicate that the  situation is progressing.  Clearly,  major  changes will  have 
to take place when  all the directives relating to public  procurement  have been 
adopted  and  incorporated  in  national  legislation.  Measures  to  tighten  up  the 
monitoring machinery in this area will then be an essential priority. 
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